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QUESTION PRESENTED 
When is a patent’s reference to a computer, or 
computer-implemented service like the Internet, 
sufficient to make an unpatentable abstract concept 
patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101? 
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WildTangent, Inc. has no parent company and no 
publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock. 
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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
   
Petitioner, WildTangent, Inc. (WildTangent) 
respectfully petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari 
to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit in this case. 
OPINIONS BELOW 
This Court’s order granting certiorari, vacating the 
judgment, and remanding in light of Mayo 
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, 
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012), is reported at 132 S. Ct. 
2431 (App. 68a).  The opinion of the court of appeals 
following remand (App. 1a-39a) is available at 2013 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 12715.  The court of appeals’ original 
opinion (App. 40a-53a) is reported at 657 F.3d 1323.  
The opinion of the district court (App. 54a-67a) is 
available at 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93453. 
JURISDICTION 
The court of appeals entered its judgment following 
this Court’s remand on June 21, 2013.  App. 1a.  This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
Article I, Section 8 of the United States 
Constitution and 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b) and 101 are 
reprinted in the appendix hereto.  App. 73a-75a. 
INTRODUCTION 
Twice in recent terms, this Court has had to review 
and set aside the Federal Circuit’s decisions about the 
scope of patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 
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§ 101, after concluding that the Federal Circuit failed 
to heed the Supreme Court’s guidance on this issue.  
Both cases involved situations where the Court had 
asked the Federal Circuit to reconsider its decision in 
light of this Court’s intervening decisions calling for a 
more rigorous analysis under § 101, and both times the 
Federal Circuit adhered to its prior ruling—
necessitating this Court’s plenary review.  See Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. 
Ct. 1289 (2012); Association for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); see also 
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (affirming 
judgment, but rejecting Federal Circuit’s § 101 test).1 
This case fits the same pattern.  At issue is the 
eligibility under § 101 of a patent that seeks a 
monopoly over an indisputably abstract idea—using 
advertising as currency—over the Internet.  After the 
Federal Circuit initially held that the patent at issue 
was eligible under § 101, this Court granted 
WildTangent’s petition for certiorari, vacated the 
judgment, and remanded for reconsideration in light of 
Mayo.  App. 68a.  In Mayo, this Court unanimously 
directed the Federal Circuit to apply the § 101 inquiry 
with more rigor.  On remand in this case, however, the 
                                                 
1  Members of the Federal Circuit have themselves recognized 
this trend.  See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 
1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting in part) (“The 
Supreme Court has taken a number of our recent decisions and, in 
each instance, concluded that the claims at issue were not patent-
eligible.” (citing Bilski, Mayo, Myriad)); CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice 
Corp. Pty. Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Prost, J., 
dissenting) (“Just a few months ago, the Supreme Court reversed 
us in a § 101 case for a second time in the last three terms, hinting 
(not so tacitly) that our subject matter patentability test is not 
sufficiently exacting.” (citing Mayo and Bilski)). 
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Federal Circuit not only reached the same result as it 
did before Mayo, but did so in a decision that goes even 
further than its initial decision in dismantling § 101 as a 
meaningful screening device.  Indeed, although he 
agreed with the bottom-line result, one Judge on the 
panel below took the unusual step of writing separately 
to explain his belief that the Federal Circuit “should 
concisely and faithfully follow” Mayo rather than 
“set[ting] forth [its] own independent views, however 
valid [it] considers them to be.”  Id. at 36a-37a.  
The decision in this case is particularly problematic 
because it seeks to fill the void left in the wake of the 
Federal Circuit’s failed en banc hearing in CLS Bank 
International v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., which produced 
multiple conflicting opinions on the patent eligibility of 
computer-implemented claims but no majority 
rationale.  717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013).  The decision 
in this case is written in sweeping doctrinal terms that 
sharply conflict not only with this Court’s precedents 
but with the Federal Circuit’s prior decisions.  Here, 
the Federal Circuit frankly recognized that the “idea 
that advertising can be used as a form of currency”—
“is abstract,” just like the unpatentable abstract idea in 
Bilski.  App. 28a.  But the court held that the “broadly 
claimed” method at issue satisfied § 101 as a 
patentable-eligible application of that abstract concept 
because it “invokes computers and application of 
computer technology” and “involves an extensive 
computer interface.”  Id. at 35a, 29a, 33a.  Yet the 
patent itself does not reference any “computer 
interface,” much less specify computer programming.  
Instead, it merely claims a method in which one step is 
conducted “at an Internet website.”  Id. at 2a.   
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The Federal Circuit’s decision in this case 
establishes a virtually insurmountable rule that 
computer-related method claims are patent eligible.  
That result and the Federal Circuit’s new § 101 
framework directly conflict with this Court’s decision 
in Mayo and other precedents.  The decision in this 
case completely revamps the law in this area and 
transforms § 101 into little more than a statutory 
preordination of patent eligibility.  The decision also 
exacerbates the untenable conflict and confusion in the 
Federal Circuit on the application of § 101 to computer-
related patents.  The Federal Circuit is hopelessly 
divided, and the Court should not permit this extreme 
decision to set the ground rules for § 101 going 
forward.  Moreover, the patent eligibility of computer-
related methods is undeniably important and impacts 
an increasingly important sector of the Nation’s 
economy.  This Court’s review is urgently needed. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Patent Act 
Section 101 of the Patent Act establishes the 
gateway subject-matter eligibility requirement for all 
patents.  It provides that “[w]hoever invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of 
this title.”  35 U.S.C. § 101.  The Act further states that 
“‘process’ means process, art or method, and includes a 
new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, 
composition of matter, or material.”  Id. § 100(b). 
This Court has “‘long held’” that § 101 “‘contains an 
important implicit exception[:] Laws of nature, natural 
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phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.’”  
Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 
1293) (alteration in original).  These are “‘the basic 
tools of scientific and technological work,’” id., and 
accordingly they are “‘part of the storehouse of 
knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none.’”  Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).  These 
exceptions “have defined the reach of the statute as a 
matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years.”  
Id.  And Congress—which is well aware of this Court’s 
decisions—has not sought to curtail the exceptions. 
B. Underlying Facts 
Advertising is as old as markets.  And purveyors of 
goods or services have long understood that those 
seeking access to copyrighted content are excellent 
subjects for advertising.  That is why broadcasters 
decided almost as soon as television signals hit the 
airways to imbed advertisements in their 
programming—effectively forcing viewers, especially 
before the advent of recording devices, to watch 
commercials to view programming.  The patent at issue 
claims that basic economic concept in the context of one 
of the most significant economic developments in 
history—the Internet and e-commerce marketplace. 
WildTangent operates a games service that allows 
consumers around the world to access downloadable, 
online, and social games via the Internet.  Rather than 
paying to play, consumers can let an advertiser sponsor 
free game play sessions.  To do so, the consumer must 
agree to display an advertisement before he is given 
access to the game.  As most users of the Internet have 
experienced, numerous websites likewise restrict 
access to content by prompting users to view 
6 
 
advertisements before gaining access to the desired 
content.  Navigating such advertisements can be the 
bane of using the Internet but—just like TV 
commercials—such advertisements have become a 
basic economic staple in the e-commerce environment. 
The patent-in-suit, U.S. Patent No. 7,346,545 (the 
’545 patent), issued March 18, 2008, and assigned to 
respondent Ultramercial, claims exclusivity on the 
basic economic concept of trading advertisement 
viewing for access to content—over the Internet.  See 
Fed. Cir. JA 473-82.  The preamble to claim 1 describes 
it as a “method for distribution of products over the 
Internet.”  ’545 patent col. 8 l.5 (Fed. Cir. JA 481); see 
also App. 2a.  It lists eleven basic steps that relate to 
receiving the content, selecting an advertisement, and 
restricting access to the content based on 
advertisement viewing.  App. 2a-3a.  Step three states 
that the content should be offered “for sale at an 
Internet website.”  ’545 patent col. 8 ll.20-21 (Fed. Cir. 
JA 481); see also App. 2a.  Claim 8, the only other 
independent claim, similarly requires listing products 
“on an Internet website.”  Id. col. 9 ll.3-4 (Fed. Cir. JA 
482).  It is undisputed that the patent does not specify 
any computer programming.  See App. 29a.2   
                                                 
2  As the district court explained, the eleven steps are: 
1) receiving media from content provider, 2) selecting an ad 
after consulting an activity log to determine how many times the 
ad has been played and how many more times it need be played, 
3) offering media products on the Internet, 4) restricting general 
public access to the media, 5) offering various media to 
customers for free in exchange for their watching the selected 
ad, 6) receiving a request to view the media from the Internet 
user, 7) facilitating the display of the ad, 8) allowing the Internet 
user access to the media, 9) same as 8 but for interactive media, 
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C. District Court Litigation 
In September 2009, Ultramercial filed suit in the 
Central District of California, asserting that 
WildTangent—along with Hulu, LLC, and YouTube, 
LLC, which were later dismissed, id. at 4a—had 
infringed its ’545 patent by limiting access to content 
on the popular Internet websites that defendants 
operate based on advertisement viewing.  WildTangent 
and the other defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) on the ground that the ’545 patent does not 
claim patent-eligible subject matter under § 101.   
In August 2010, after receiving briefing on Bilski, 
the district court granted the motion, holding that the 
patent claimed an abstract idea.  App. 57a-58a.  The 
Court explained that “the concept of advertisement-
media-exchange does not become patentable simply 
because the patentee claims to have limited its 
application to the Internet or computers.”  Id. at 58a-
65a (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 
(1972)).  Indeed, the court recognized, a contrary rule 
would render “completely toothless” (id. at 63a) the 
machine-or-transformation test that this Court 
reaffirmed in Bilski is “a useful and important clue” for 
determining patent eligibility.  130 S. Ct. at 3227.  The 
court then concluded that this case is “very similar” to 
Bilski because the “core of the ’545 patent is the basic 
idea that one can use advertisement as an exchange or 
currency,” which is abstract, and the “added features, 
examples, or limitations of the ’545 patent do not make 
it patentable” because they do not “limit the patent in a 
                                                                                                    
10) recording the transaction in the activity log, and 
11) receiving payment from sponsor for the ad.   
App. 55a; see also id. at 29a (recognizing steps). 
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meaningful way.”  App. 66a.  Instead, the court held, 
the patent here, like the one in Bilski, “discloses an 
abstract idea garnished with accessories.”  Id.   
D. Federal Circuit’s Initial Decision 
In September 2011, the Federal Circuit reversed.  
In a broadly worded opinion, the court dispensed with 
the machine-or-transformation test for determining 
patent eligibility as having “far less application to the 
inventions of the Information Age.”  Id. at 46a.  The 
court then applied a new and heightened standard for 
abstractness formulated by the Federal Circuit and 
effectively supplanted § 101’s gateway screening role 
with the other statutory grounds for invalidity (§§ 102, 
103, 112).  The court held that “‘this disqualifying 
characteristic should exhibit itself so manifestly as to 
override the broad statutory categories of eligible 
subject matter and the statutory context that directs 
primary attention on the patentability criteria of the 
rest of the Patent Act.’”  Id. at 47a (quoting Research 
Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (emphasis added)).    
Applying that understanding, the Federal Circuit 
recognized that the “idea that advertising can be used 
as a form of currency is abstract, just as the vague, 
unapplied concept of hedging proved patent-ineligible 
in Bilski.”  Id. at 51a.  But the court reasoned that the 
’545 patent discloses a patentable “practical 
application” of this idea on the ground that its steps—
which do not spell out any computer programming but 
instead simply refer in passing to “an Internet 
website”—are “likely to require intricate and complex 
computer programming” and “clearly require specific 
application to the Internet and a cyber-market 
environment.”  Id. at 51a (emphasis added). 
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E. This Court’s GVR Order 
In May 2012—shortly after this Court decided 
Mayo—the Court granted WildTangent’s petition for 
certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the 
case for further consideration in light of Mayo.  App. 
68a.  In Mayo, the Court unanimously held that certain 
medical diagnostic methods were not patent eligible 
because they “add nothing specific to the laws of nature 
other than what is well-understood, routine, 
conventional activity, previously engaged in by those in 
the field.”  132 S. Ct. at 1299.  In the course of its 
decision, the Court undertook a broad-based review of 
its precedents in this area and reaffirmed that “simply 
implementing a mathematical principle on a physical 
machine, namely a computer, [i]s not a patentable 
application of that principle.”  Id. at 1301 (citing 
Benson).  The Court also rejected an approach that 
would “substitute §§ 102, 103, and 112 inquiries for the 
better established inquiry under § 101” because that 
would “make the ‘law of nature’ exception to § 101 
patentability a dead letter.”  Id. at 1303-04.  
F. En Banc Decision In CLS Bank 
In October 2012—after this Court had GVR’d this 
case—the Federal Circuit vacated the panel decision in 
CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 
finding the computer-related claims at issue in that 
case patent eligible under § 101 and agreed to hear the 
case en banc.  484 F. App’x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  The 
claims in CLS Bank cover the abstract concept of using 
a computerized trading platform for reducing 
“settlement risk.”  Although the claims are computer-
implemented and broken into several steps (including 
using a “supervisory institution” and adjusted “shadow 
debit records”), and although the specification refers to 
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“a system called ‘INVENTICO’” and a “CONTRACT 
APP,” CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 685 
F.3d 1341, 1343, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012), the claims 
require the use of a computer in only a generalized 
way.  CLS Bank also included additional claims drawn 
to systems and computer-readable medium, though the 
declaratory judgment plaintiff CLS Bank had argued 
that the eligibility of these claims under § 101 was tied 
to the eligibility of the method claims.  Id. at 1343-44. 
In May 2013, the en banc court issued a per curiam 
opinion and judgment in CLS Bank announcing that a 
majority of the court (seven of the ten members) had 
affirmed the district court’s holding that the method 
claims and computer-readable media claims are not 
eligible under § 101, and that an equally divided court 
had affirmed the district court’s holding that the 
asserted system claims are not eligible under § 101 
either.  In addition, a majority of the court (eight 
members) concluded that the method, medium, and 
system claims “should rise or fall together in the § 101 
analysis.”  CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1274 n.1 (Lourie, J., 
concurring).  However, a majority of the court was 
unable to agree on a single rationale producing that 
result and the per curiam opinion was accompanied by 
five separate non-majority opinions setting out 
competing views of the proper analysis under § 101.3 
G. Federal Circuit’s Decision On Remand 
In June 2013—not long after the en banc court 
issued its judgment in CLS Bank and without 
                                                 
3  On July 18, 2013, the losing patent holder in CLS Bank 
indicated its intention to seek certiorari and requested an 
extension of time to file a petition to September 6, 2013, which was 
granted.  Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, No. 13A95. 
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requesting any additional briefing or oral argument on 
this Court’s GVR order—the panel in this case acted to 
fill the doctrinal void left by the splintered decision in 
CLS Bank by issuing a strongly worded decision 
reaffirming the court’s initial decision finding that the 
claims were patent eligible under § 101 and mapping 
out a sweeping set of guidelines for analyzing the 
eligibility of computer-implemented patents under 
§ 101.  As a practical matter, the only substantive 
change to the court’s § 101 analysis in light of Mayo 
compared to its initial analysis of the claims before 
Mayo was the creation of additional barriers to 
showing abstractness under the new decision. 
The court framed the issue with a heavy thumb—if 
not truck—on the scale for patent eligibility, 
emphasizing that it will be “rare” and is “normally” 
“improper” to dismiss a patent infringement suit on 
§ 101 grounds, that claim construction “normally will be 
required,” and that a party must demonstrate 
abstractness by clear and convincing evidence.  App. 
4a-8a.  The court relegated § 101 to a “limited role” that 
is “merely a threshold check” and “no more than a 
‘coarse eligibility filter.’”  Id. at 8a-10a (citation 
omitted).  Instead, the court viewed the “substantive 
conditions of eligibility”—§ 102 (novelty), § 103 
(obviousness), § 112 (adequate disclosure)—as doing 
the work of weeding out meritless claims.  Id.  The 
court downplayed the longstanding exceptions to §101 
and asserted that they “should apply narrowly” and 
“must be rare.”  Id. at 12a.  The court again dismissed 
the machine-or-transformation test as having “far less 
application” to technological patents.  Id. at 14a. 
The court discussed this Court’s cases interpreting 
the abstract idea exception, including Mayo, Bilski, 
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and Benson, id. at 15a-25a, and concluded its discussion 
by proclaiming various “guideposts specific to 
computer-implemented inventions,” id. at 25a.  Among 
other things, the court ruled that “the fact that a claim 
is limited by a tie to a computer is an important 
indication of patent eligibility,” and that “‘inventions 
with specific applications or improvements to 
technologies in the marketplace are not likely to be so 
abstract that they override the statutory language and 
framework of the Patent Act.’”  Id. at 25a-27a 
(emphasis added) (quoting Research Corp.). 
In analyzing the claims under that framework, the 
court recognized that it is undisputed that the “idea 
that advertising can be used as a form of currency is 
abstract,” similar to the concept of hedging that was 
patent ineligible in Bilski.  Id. at 28a.  But the court 
found that the patent claims an eligible application of 
that concept because it “invokes computers and 
applications of computer technology.”  Id. at 29a-30a.  
The court explained that it could “see” that the patent’s 
steps “require intricate and complex computer 
programming,” id.—even though the patent does not 
disclose any such programming.  Focusing on two 
figures in the specification—rather than the claim 
language—the court concluded that the patent 
“involves an extensive computer interface,” making it 
patent eligible.  Id. at 30a-33a.  The court added the 
caveat that it did “not define the level of programming 
complexity required before a computer implemented 
method can be patent-eligible,” even though it had not 
identified any programming in the patent.  Id. at 33a.  
The court disavowed holding that “use of an Internet 
website to practice such a method is . . . sufficient in 
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every case to satisfy § 101,” but the court did not 
identify anything else that set this patent apart.  Id.  
Finally, the court asserted that the claims “are not 
highly generalized,” despite recognizing in the very 
next paragraph that the “broadly claimed method” at 
issue “does not specify a particular mechanism for 
delivering media content to the consumer.”  Id. at 34a-
35a.  In reaching this conclusion, the court again 
substituted § 112’s written description requirement to 
do the work of § 101.  Id. at 35a-36a.  Ultimately, the 
court concluded that “the claimed invention is not ‘so 
manifestly abstract as to override the statutory 
language of section 101.’”  Id. at 36a (emphasis added) 
(quoting Research Corp.).  
Judge Lourie concurred in the decision, but wrote 
separately because he believed the court did not 
“concisely and faithfully” follow Mayo.  Id. at 36a-37a.  
He stated:  “It is our obligation to attempt to follow the 
Supreme Court’s guidance in Mayo rather than to set 
forth our own independent views, however valid we 
may consider them to be.”  Id. at 37a.  He agreed with 
the majority’s conclusion that the claims are patent 
eligible but disagreed with its reasoning, explaining 
that “[w]hile a computer or complex computer 
program, as discussed by the majority opinion, may be 
necessary to perform the method, it is not what the 
claim specifically requires and thus should not be the 
focus of the analysis.”  Id. at 38a-39a.  Instead, he 
simply asserted without explanation that the “added 
limitations in these claims represent significantly more 
than the underlying abstract idea of using advertising 
as an exchange or currency.”  Id. at 39a.  
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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION 
In few cases is the need for this Court’s 
intervention so apparent.  The proper application of 
§ 101’s gateway subject-matter eligibility requirement 
to computer-implemented patent claims is a matter of 
extraordinary importance—and is becoming more 
important virtually by the day as the number of 
computer-implemented method patents explodes.  The 
sweeping decision below not only largely disregards 
this Court’s GVR order but sharply conflicts with this 
Court’s precedents.  The Federal Circuit, as its recent 
en banc experiment in CLS Bank underscores, is 
hopelessly divided on the question presented.  And 
whereas the Federal Circuit’s free-for-all in CLS Bank 
establishes no law beyond its judgment, the decision in 
this case fills the vacuum left by CLS Bank with a 
sweeping legal framework that eliminates § 101 as a 
meaningful screening mechanism for computer-
implemented claims.  Certiorari is warranted. 
I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S DECISION IS 
FUNDAMENTALLY OUT OF STEP WITH 
THIS COURT’S PRECEDENTS  
As one Federal Circuit Judge has observed, in 
Mayo and other recent decisions, this Court has 
“hint[ed] (not so tacitly) that [the Federal Circuit’s] 
subject matter patentability test is not sufficiently 
exacting.”  CLS Bank, 685 F.3d at 1356 (Prost, J., 
dissenting).  In this case, the Court asked the Federal 
Circuit to reconsider its initial decision in light of 
Mayo.  But rather than heed the guidance in Mayo, the 
Federal Circuit used the occasion to pronounce its 
“independent views” on § 101.  App. 36a-37a (Lourie, J., 
concurring).  The Federal Circuit’s “independent 
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views” on the proper role of § 101 and how it applies to 
computer-implemented methods directly conflict with 
Mayo and this Court’s other precedents.  Instead of 
treating § 101 as a meaningful screening mechanism to 
weed out ineligible subject matter, the Federal Circuit 
diminished § 101’s role so that virtually anything that 
qualifies as a “process” will pass muster.  To make 
matters worse, in direct conflict with Mayo, Bilski, and 
Benson, the Federal Circuit in this case has erected a 
legal framework that effectively gives computer-
implemented methods a “free pass” through § 101.   
A. The Federal Circuit’s Conception Of The 
Role Of § 101 Is Sharply At Odds With 
This Court’s Precedents 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in this case revamps 
the § 101 inquiry established by this Court and all but 
eliminates § 101 as a genuine screening tool. 
1. In stark contrast with the robust role reaffirmed 
in Mayo, the Federal Circuit below held that § 101 has 
only a “limited role” and is “no more than a ‘coarse 
eligibility filter.’”  App. 9a-10a (citation omitted); see 
also id. at 6a (“‘coarse’ gauge” (citation omitted)).  The 
court asserted that “[b]road inclusivity is the 
congressional goal of § 101” and the “broadly 
permissive nature” of § 101 is limited only by “narrow 
judicial” exceptions that “should apply narrowly” and 
“must be rare.”  Id. at 10a-12a.  According to the court, 
instead of § 101, the “substantive criteria for 
patentability”—§§ 102, 103, and 112—do the real work 
in screening claims.  Id. at 10a.  And the court explicitly 
substituted § 112 for § 101: “[t]he ‘coarse eligibility 
filter’ of § 101 is not the statutory tool to address 
concerns about vagueness, indefinite disclosure, or lack 
of enablement, as these infirmities are expressly 
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addressed by § 112.”  Id. at 35a.  In other words, while 
the court purportedly grounded its decision in the 
statute, the court effectively re-wrote the statute. 
This Court emphatically rejected that conception of 
§ 101 in Mayo.  Indeed, in Mayo, the Court issued a 
“unanimous directive to apply the patentable subject 
matter test with more vigor.”  CLS Bank, 685 F.3d at 
1356 (Prost, J., dissenting).  Among other things, Mayo 
reaffirms that the exceptions to § 101 recognized by 
this Court are central to the § 101 analysis.  In Mayo, 
the Court stressed that it has “long held” that § 101 
“contains an important implicit exception” that “‘[l]aws 
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas’ are 
not patentable.”  132 S. Ct. at 1293 (emphasis added); 
see also Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116 (same).  Far from 
insignificant, these exceptions—the Court 
emphasized—“have defined the reach of the statute as 
a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 
years.”  Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (emphasis added).   
Critically, after reviewing its past cases applying 
§ 101, the Court reaffirmed in Mayo that § 101 
performs a “screening function” separate and apart 
from other provisions of the Patent Act.  132 S. Ct. at 
1303-04.  This Court explicitly rejected an approach—
like the one adopted by the Federal Circuit below—
that would “shift the patent eligibility inquiry entirely 
to these later sections” because it would make the 
longstanding exceptions to § 101 patentability a “dead 
letter” and is “not consistent with prior law.”  Id.  
Moreover, in direct contrast to the Federal Circuit’s 
treatment of § 112 as subsuming § 101, this Court held 
that a patent embodying “a law of nature (or its 
equivalent)” could satisfy § 112 and yet still flunk § 101 
because of the risk that the patent “would significantly 
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impede future innovation.”  Id. at 1304 (emphasis 
added).  The Federal Circuit directly contravened 
Mayo by effectively eliminating § 101’s own screening 
role in favor of other grounds for invalidity.  
The United States has explicitly rejected the 
Federal Circuit’s position.  See U.S. Amicus Br., CLS 
Bank, 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (No. 2011-1301) 
(en banc), 2012 WL 6838192 (“U.S. CLS Bank Br.”).  
The government has recognized that Bilski and Mayo 
direct courts to approach the exceptions to § 101 “more 
rigorously.”  Id. at 1.  The Federal Circuit’s approach is 
just the opposite.  The United States also recognized 
Mayo’s clear command that “§ 101 performs a 
screening function that these other provisions”—
§§ 102, 103, and 112—“do not.”  Id. at 20.4 
2.   The Federal Circuit also contravened this 
Court’s precedents by adopting a heightened standard 
for abstractness—ratcheting up the burden in 
establishing that a claim is ineligible under § 101 
because it is abstract.  The court below ultimately held 
that the claimed invention in this case is patent eligible 
because it “is not ‘so manifestly abstract as to override 
the statutory language of section 101.’”  App. 36a 
(emphasis added) (quoting Research Corp.); see also id. 
at 27a (“‘so abstract’” (quoting Research Corp.)).   
Neither Mayo nor this Court’s other precedents 
have applied anything like this heightened, “manifest 
abstractness” standard.  The question under this 
Court’s longstanding precedent is whether the subject 
                                                 
4  While varying in some respects with WildTangent’s position 
on the role of § 101, the government’s position in CLS Bank calls 
for a more rigorous role for § 101 than the Federal Circuit did here 
and rejects key elements of the Federal Circuit’s framework. 
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matter is an “abstract idea”—period.  See Myriad, 133 
S. Ct. at 2116; Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293; Bilski, 130 S. 
Ct. at 3225, 3230.  There is no basis for increasing the 
standard from abstractness to manifest abstractness.  
If anything, this Court’s precedents require tilting the 
inquiry in the opposite direction because they require a 
showing that the patent adds “significantly more” to 
the law of nature (or abstract idea) claimed in order to 
satisfy § 101.  See, e.g., Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (citing 
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), Bilski), 1297 
(patent must do “significantly more than simply 
describe the[] natural relations”).  By contrast, the 
“manifest abstractness” standard is simply “an escape 
hatch” from § 101.  CLS Bank, 685 F.3d at 1357 (Prost, 
J., dissenting) (rejecting court’s application of 
analogous “‘manifestly evident’ standard”). 
The United States has unequivocally rejected the 
Federal Circuit’s heightened standard for abstractness, 
which originated in Research Corp.  The government 
“does not believe it is appropriate to impose a 
requirement of ‘manifest’ abstractness for invalidity 
under § 101.”  U.S. CLS Bank Br. 15 (citing Research 
Corp.).  Indeed, as the government has explained, “[a]n 
additional, substantive requirement of ‘manifest’ 
abstractness under § 101 has no basis in the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence and would arguably be at odds 
with the exception itself, which prohibits patents on all 
abstract ideas, not just those that are manifestly 
abstract.”  Id. (first emphasis added). 
3.   The Federal Circuit further diminished § 101’s 
role by repeatedly emphasizing that it should not be 
the basis for dismissal at the pleading stage.  The court 
admonished district courts that dismissal on § 101 
grounds should be “rare,” “the exception,” and is 
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“normally” “improper” and “inappropriate.”  App. 4a-
7a, 17a.  The court based this new rule on its 
overgeneralized assertion that the § 101 analysis is 
“rife with underlying factual issues” and thus “claim 
construction normally will be required.”  Id. at 5a-6a; 
see also id. at 17a, 21a.  But that is certainly not true in 
all cases, and there is no basis for adopting a 
categorical rule (or virtually categorical rule) against 
invoking § 101 at the pleading stage.  Indeed, in this 
very case, the Federal Circuit recognized that there are 
no such factual issues and that “the subject matter at 
stake and its eligibility does not require formal claim 
construction.”  Id. at 7a-8a; accord id. at 29a; id. at 38a 
(Lourie, J., concurring).  The court’s observations, 
therefore, are not apt in this case, and serve no purpose 
other than to discourage district courts from testing 
patent claims under § 101’s eligibility requirement.  
Elimination of § 101 as a defense at the pleading 
stage conflicts with this Court’s precedents.  Section 
101 is a “threshold test,” Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225, and 
a “screening” device, Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303.  It will 
lose its utility as such if parties have to go through 
expensive discovery and formal claim construction 
before § 101 patent eligibility can be determined.  This 
Court has repeatedly recognized that other threshold 
issues must be adjudicated as soon as possible.  See 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) 
(deficiency of a claim should “‘be exposed at the point 
of minimum expenditure of time and money by the 
parties and the court.’” (citations omitted)); Pearson v. 
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (“‘[W]e repeatedly 
have stressed the importance of resolving immunity 
questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.’” 
(citation omitted)).  Furthermore, this Court has 
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previously held that patents are ineligible under § 101 
without formal claim construction.  Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 
3218.  The Federal Circuit’s attempt to close the door 
on § 101 challenges at the pleading stage is unfounded.5 
In all these ways, the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
this case establishes a far different—and less 
exacting—role for § 101 than the one recognized by this 
Court in Mayo and other decisions. 
B. The Federal Circuit’s Decision Effectively 
Gives Computer-Implemented Claims A 
“Free Pass” Through § 101 
The Federal Circuit’s framework is written in broad 
terms that could apply to all patents regardless of their 
subject matter, but its decision establishes a virtually 
insurmountable rule of patent eligibility under § 101 for 
computer-implemented claims in particular.  That rule 
is sharply at odds with this Court’s precedents. 
1.   The decision below directly contravenes the key 
teaching of Mayo—that “simply appending 
conventional steps, specified at a high level of 
generality, to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas cannot make those laws, phenomena, and 
ideas patentable.”  132 S. Ct. at 1300.  Instead, Mayo 
holds, a patent must claim an “inventive concept” that 
does “significantly more” than the law of nature (or 
abstract idea) itself.  Id. at 1294; see CLS Bank, 685 
F.3d at 1356 (Mayo “made clear what had been written 
                                                 
5  The Federal Circuit also required “clear and convincing 
evidence” of abstractness, even though it recognized that there 
are no disputed factual issues precluding the § 101 analysis here.  
See, e.g., App. 6a, 14a.  But this Court has never applied that 
evidentiary standard in the § 101 analysis, and it could not apply 
to the legal determination of abstractness under § 101. 
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between the lines before:  It is not sufficient to put an 
abstract idea into use with ‘[p]urely “conventional or 
obvious” “pre-solution activity.”’” (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted) (Prost, J., dissenting)).  The 
decision below flouts that principle by holding that a 
reference to a “conventional” function that can be 
performed by any general-purpose computer straight 
off the shelf at Best Buy or the Apple Store—accessing 
an Internet website—is sufficient to transform an 
abstract idea into a patent eligible invention. 
In Mayo, the medical diagnostic method failed that 
test because it “simply tells doctors to: (1) measure 
(somehow) the current level of the relevant metabolite, 
(2) use particular (unpatentable) laws of nature (which 
the claim sets forth) to calculate the current 
toxicity/inefficacy limits, and (3) reconsider the drug 
dosage in light of the law.”  132 S. Ct.  at 1299.  The 
Court explained that “[t]hese instructions add nothing 
specific to the laws of nature other than what is well-
understood, routine, conventional activity, previously 
engaged in by those in the field,” but instead “the effect 
is simply to tell doctors to apply the law somehow 
when treating their patients.”  Id. at 1299-1300.  The 
“determining” step failed because it “is set forth in 
highly general language covering all processes . . . 
including later discovered processes that measure 
metabolite levels in new ways.”  Id. at 1302. 
So too here.  Indeed, if anything the patent at issue 
here is even more general than the one held ineligible 
in Mayo and at most invokes a routine use of a general-
purpose computer.  The Federal Circuit’s decision that 
the claims at issue are patent eligible thus defies this 
Court’s ruling in Mayo.  The Federal Circuit 
emphasized that the claimed invention must entail an 
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“extensive computer interface.”  App. 33a.  But the 
patent does not specify any computer programming 
and, instead, simply refers to “providing the media 
products for sale at an Internet website.”  ’545 patent 
col. 8 ll.20-21 (Fed. Cir. JA 481).  That “limit” could not 
be any more generalized.  Reliance on the patent’s 
reference to the Internet (or the generic computer 
“interface” required to access the Internet) to satisfy 
§ 101 is precisely what this Court prohibited in Mayo 
when it stated that “simply appending conventional 
steps, specified at a high level of generality, to . . . 
abstract ideas cannot make those laws, phenomena, and 
ideas patentable.”  132 S. Ct. at 1300. 
According to the Federal Circuit, “many of [the 
claim’s] steps require”—or “likely” require, App. 49a—
“intricate and complex computer programming,” and 
“several steps plainly require that the method be 
performed through computers, on the internet, and in a 
cyber-market environment.”  Id. at 29a-30a.  But the 
patent itself does not contain any specific computer 
programming.  Judge Lourie chided the majority for 
relying on “a computer or complex computer program” 
because “it is not what the claim specifically requires 
and thus should not be the focus of the analysis.”  Id. at 
38a-39a.  And even the majority recognized that the 
“broadly claimed” method at issue “does not specify a 
particular mechanism for delivering media content to 
the consumer.”  Id. at 35a. The Federal Circuit’s 
reliance on non-existent “complex computer 
programming” to transform an unpatentable abstract 
idea into a patent-eligible one is even more problematic 
than the analysis this Court rejected in Mayo.   
Just as “one must do more than simply state the law 
of nature while adding the words ‘apply it,’” Mayo, 132 
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S. Ct. at 1294, one must do more than simply state the 
abstract idea and add the words “apply it on a 
computer”—or “over the Internet.”  The determining 
step in Mayo was too general because it “cover[ed] all 
processes” “including later discovered processes” for 
measuring metabolites.  Here, the steps in the ’545 
patent are too general because they do not specify any 
computer programming and thus could cover any 
programming that would effectuate the broadly 
claimed process, including later discovered 
programming.  Ultramercial’s patent does not add 
anything new or inventive about how to use 
advertising as currency over the Internet.  Instead, by 
adding the generic phrase “at an Internet website” to 
an otherwise abstract idea, Ultramercial is simply 
trying to monopolize the abstract idea of trading 
advertisement viewing for content over the Internet,  
claiming dominion over inventions that Ultramercial 
never conceived and that must be implemented 
through computer programming not specified in the 
’545 patent.  Granting Ultramercial exclusive patent 
rights when it has not added any “inventive concept” is 
antithetical to the purposes of the patent system, see 
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294, 1301-03, if not beyond the 
scope of the Patent Clause, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit noted that 
delivery of the media to the consumer could be 
accomplished through numerous well-known means: 
“FTP downloads, email, or real-time streaming.”  App. 
37a.  Under Mayo, the addition of “well-understood, 
routine, conventional activity” does not make the 
abstract idea patent eligible.  132 S. Ct. at 1299-1300. 
2.   The Court’s decision in Mayo also sharpens the 
direct conflict between the decision below and this 
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Court’s decisions in Bilski, Flook, and Benson, which 
also held that an abstract idea does not become patent 
eligible simply by “limiting” it to a particular field or 
technological environment or adding conventional 
steps.  Holding that such claims are patent eligible 
would let “patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the 
draftsman’s art,’” id. at 1294 (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. 
at 593)—and here, a simple reference to “an Internet 
website” or generic computer implementation.   
As the Court explained in Mayo, the abstract idea 
of hedging at issue in Bilski did not become patent 
eligible by limiting it “to use in commodities and 
energy markets” and adding “‘well known random 
analysis techniques.’”  Id. at 1301 (quoting Bilski, 130 
S. Ct. at 3224).  In Flook, the abstract idea of using a 
formula to compute an updated alarm limit did not 
become patent eligible merely by adding “well known” 
limits, including “the use of computers for ‘automatic 
monitoring alarming.’”  Id. at 1299 (quoting Flook, 437 
U.S. at 594).  Unlike the patent-eligible process in 
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), the process in 
Flook “did not ‘explain how the variables used in the 
formula were to be selected, nor did the [claim] contain 
any disclosure relating to chemical processes at work 
or the means of setting off an alarm or adjusting the 
alarm limit.’”  132 S. Ct. at 1299 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192 n.14).  These limits, the 
Mayo Court reiterated, were too general and thus “did 
not limit the claim to a particular invention.”  Id.  And 
in Benson, the abstract idea of converting binary-coded 
decimal numbers to pure binary did not become patent 
eligible “simply [by] implementing [it] on a physical 
machine, namely a computer.”  Id. at 1301. 
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In stark contrast, the Federal Circuit held that the 
concededly abstract idea of using advertisements as 
currency did become patent eligible simply by 
“limiting” it to the Internet through the highly general 
statement that a product be offered “at an Internet 
website.”  That result stands in jarring contravention 
with the outcomes in Mayo, Bilski, Flook, and Benson.  
Indeed, under the Federal Circuit’s reasoning, the 
abstract concept of hedging risk in Bilski would have 
become patent eligible if the claim had simply required 
that the commodities transactions be carried out “over 
the Internet”—which is where they would most 
naturally have occurred in any event.   
“Given the ubiquity of computers in contemporary 
life, allowing a process to become patentable simply 
because it is computer-implemented or invokes the use 
of the Internet would render the subject-matter 
eligibility criteria contained in section 101 virtually 
meaningless.”  MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 
F.3d 1250, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Mayer, J., dissenting).  
For computer-implemented methods, the decision 
below is tantamount to a return to the flawed regime 
established by the Federal Circuit in State Street Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., under 
which any invention that produced a “‘useful, concrete, 
and tangible result’” is patent eligible.  149 F.3d 1368, 
1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).  This Court 
squarely rejected that test in Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231, 
recognizing that it resulted in the “granting of patents 
that ‘ranged from the somewhat ridiculous to the truly 
absurd,’” id. at 3259 (Breyer, J., concurring in 
judgment).  There is no basis to condone a return to 
that already rejected open-door policy here.  
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The United States has also recognized that this 
Court’s precedents do not permit broad rules of 
eligibility (or ineligibility) for computer-implemented 
claims.  As the government has explained, “categorical, 
bright-line tests for eligibility under § 101 are not 
appropriate,” so “recitation in a claim that . . . a method 
is implemented by a computer . . . no longer can serve 
as a virtually-dispositive indicator of patent eligibility.”  
U.S. CLS Bank Br. 5-6.  The claim must include 
“meaningful limitations” of the abstract idea, which 
does not include “a mere field-of-use limitation, a 
tangential reference to technology, [or] insignificant 
extra-solution activity.”  Id. at 7.  More specifically, the 
“mere fact that a computer may be a ‘necessary’ 
element in the claim” and “routine uses of a computer” 
for its “ordinary functions” do not meaningfully limit 
claims for § 101 purposes.  Id. at 11-12.  The Federal 
Circuit’s reliance on the use of the Internet in this case 
is plainly at odds with this position.  
3.   The Federal Circuit’s adoption of an industry-
specific framework for the technology industry also 
conflicts with this Court’s precedents.  The Federal 
Circuit stated that “‘inventions with specific 
applications or improvements to technologies in the 
marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that they 
override the statutory language and framework of the 
Patent Act.’”  App. 27a (emphasis added) (quoting 
Research Corp.).  The court further stated that 
“[b]ecause technology is ever-changing and evolves in 
unforeseeable ways, this court gives substantial weight 
to the statutory reluctance to list any new, non-
obvious, and fully disclosed subject matter as beyond 
the reach of Title 35.”  Id. at 15a (emphasis added).  As 
the United States has explained, however, “this Court 
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has traditionally eschewed” the use of an “industry-
specific calculus.”  U.S. Amicus Br. 32, Myriad, 133 
S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398).  In Mayo, the Court 
reiterated that it “must hesitate before departing from 
established general legal rules lest a new protective 
rule that seems to suit the needs of one field produce 
unforeseen results in another.”  132 S. Ct. at 1304.  
There is no reason to carve out a special rule for 
computer- or Internet-related claims. 
Nor is there any basis to dispense in this context 
with the machine-or-transformation test as a tool for 
gauging eligibility under § 101.  The Federal Circuit 
again dismissed the machine-or-transformation test as 
an anachronism for “inventions of the Information 
Age,” relying on two statements from Bilski that were 
not adopted by a majority of this Court.  App. 46a; see 
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223 n.1.  That conflicts with Bilski 
and Mayo, which reaffirmed that “the machine-or-
transformation test is a useful and important clue, an 
investigative tool, for determining whether some 
claimed inventions are processes under § 101.”  Bilski, 
130 S. Ct. at 3227; Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303.   
II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT IS HOPELESSLY 
DIVIDED ON THE APPLICATION OF § 101 
TO COMPUTER-RELATED PATENTS  
As the extraordinary outcome in CLS Bank 
underscores, the Federal Circuit is hopelessly and 
intransigently divided on the application of § 101 to 
computer-related patents.  The en banc court in CLS 
Bank split both as to result and rationale, producing 
five different opinions,  but no majority rule.  The court 
itself recognized that it left the application of § 101 to 
computer-related patents in complete disarray.   
28 
 
Chief Judge Rader observed that “[n]o portion of 
any opinion issued today other than our Per Curiam 
Judgment garners a majority,” thus “nothing said 
today beyond our judgment has the weight of 
precedent.”  717 F.3d at 1292 n.1 (dissenting in part).  
Critically, even though “a majority of the judges on the 
court agree that the method claims do not recite patent 
eligible subject matter, no majority of those judges 
agrees as to the legal rationale for that conclusion.”  Id.  
Judge Lourie agreed.  Id. at 1274 n.1 (concurring).  He 
noted that the “proper application” of § 101 “to 
computer-implemented inventions and in various other 
fields of technology has long vexed this and other 
courts” and “a framework that will provide guidance 
and predictability for patent applicants and examiners, 
litigants, and the courts” is “needed.”  Id. at 1276-77. 
But the en banc court did not supply the needed 
framework.  As Judge Newman lamented, the effort 
“to remedy distortions flowing from inconsistent 
precedent on section 101” “has failed.”  Id. at 1321 
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).  Rather than 
ameliorating the uncertainty for inventors, “[the court] 
ha[s] propounded at least three incompatible 
standards, devoid of consensus, serving simply to add 
to the unreliability and cost of the system of patents as 
an incentive for innovation.”  Id.  And Judges Linn and 
O’Malley viewed Chief Judge Rader’s analysis of the 
method claims as “internally inconsistent” with his 
analysis of the system claims.  Id. at 1330 (dissenting 
from judgment).  CLS Bank provided no guidance. 
The decision in this case underscores the conflict 
that exists in the Federal Circuit. It cannot be 
reconciled with the judgment in CLS Bank—which 
does have precedential effect.  Although the en banc 
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court reached the proper judgment that the claims at 
issue in CLS Bank were not patent eligible, the role of 
a general-purpose computer in implementing the 
computerized trading program for reducing settlement 
risk was if anything more detailed than the role of a 
general purpose computer under the claims at issue 
here.  Indeed, whereas the claim analyzed in this case 
simply refers to “an Internet website,” the claims in 
CLS Bank were much more detailed and computer 
grounded.  They referred to an “electronic adjustment” 
limitation, which the parties “agreed ‘requir[es] the use 
of a computer,’” and limitations involving shadow 
credit and debit records, which also require computer 
implementation.  685 F.3d at 1354 (alteration in 
original).  The specifications provide further detail 
about the computer implementation because they 
disclose a detailed description of “a system called 
‘INVENTICO’” and a “CONTRACT APP.”  Id.  
Moreover, because CLS Bank did not produce a 
precedential rationale for the court, the conflict 
between this case and the Federal Circuit’s pre-CLS 
Bank cases also remains.  See, e.g., Bancorp Servs., 
LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (USA), 687 
F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he use of a 
computer in an otherwise patent ineligible process for 
no more than its most basic function—making 
calculations or computations—fails to circumvent the 
prohibition against patenting abstract ideas and mental 
processes.”); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, 
Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he basic 
character of a process claim drawn to an abstract idea 
is not changed by claiming only its performance by 
computers . . . .”); Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 
1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Simply adding a ‘computer 
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aided’ limitation to a claim covering an abstract 
concept, without more, is insufficient to render the 
claim patent eligible.”).  Only this Court can resolve the 
intractable conflict in the Federal Circuit. 
III. THIS COURT’S GUIDANCE IS 
URGENTLY NEEDED ON THE 
IMPORTANT QUESTION PRESENTED 
This Court’s guidance is urgently needed on the 
patentability of computer-implemented methods.  
Thousands of patents apply to some aspect of the 
Internet.  Indeed, one source estimated that 11,000 
patents apply just to selling, shipping, or advertising 
products online.  James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, 
Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and 
Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 9-9 (2008).  This case 
involves a business method implemented “at an 
Internet website,” but the Federal Circuit’s broad 
reasoning also may impact software and other 
technological patents.  Scholars have estimated that 
20,000 software patents are granted each year.  See 
James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look 
at Software Patents, 16 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 157, 
158 (2007).  And the software industry is one of the 
critical drivers and fastest growing components of our 
Nation’s economy.  See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Do 
Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software 
Industry?, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 961, 963 (2005).  Moreover, 
as this case illustrates, “[m]any software and business 
method patents simply describe a basic, well-known 
concept that has been implemented or applied using 
conventional computer technology.”  MySpace, 672 
F.3d at 1267 (Mayer, J., dissenting).   
The Federal Circuit’s intractable internal conflict 
over § 101 has thrown this entire category of patents 
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into a state of intolerable uncertainty.  Indeed, even 
before the dust up in CLS Bank, commentators 
described the case law on the patent eligibility of 
computer-related inventions as “extraordinarily 
unclear”—a “rule-less wasteland of post-Bilski 
jurisprudence” that “is excruciatingly difficult to 
maneuver.”  Robert D. Swanson, Note: Section 101 and 
Computer-Implemented Inventions, 16 Stan. Tech. L. 
Rev. 161, 162, 184 (2012).  The “nightmare” of fractured 
opinions in CLS Bank did not resolve the issue.6  And 
the decision below added to the conflict.  According to 
commentators, the Federal Circuit’s broad ruling in 
this case “set[s] the stage for rampant patent litigation 
to continue unchecked” and continues to evidence “‘two 
Federal Circuits on this issue,’” furthering a “kind of 
legal uncertainty [that] can’t last forever.”7  Moreover, 
the Federal Circuit’s broad ruling “set[s] up a conflict” 
with this Court’s decisions and “could be seen as a 
show of defiance” after this Court’s GVR order.8   
The current uncertainty makes investments riskier 
and stifles innovation in the technology sector.  As 
                                                 
6  Gene Quinn, Federal Circuit Nightmare in CLS Bank v. 
Alice Corp., IPWatchdog (May 10, 2013), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/05/10/federal-circuit-nightmare-
in-cls-bank-v-alice-corp/id=40230/. 
7  Timothy B. Lee, One of the worst patents ever just got upheld 
in court, Washington Post, Wonkblog, (June 24, 2013),  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/06/24/on
e-of-the-worst-patents-ever-just-got-upheld-in-court/ (citation 
omitted).  
8  Daniel Fisher, Take That, SCOTUS: Appeals Court 
Reinstates Patent On Video-Ad Technology, Forbes (June 21, 
2013),  http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/06/21/take-
that-scotus-appeals-court-reinstates-patent-on-video-ad-
technology/.  
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Judge Newman explained, “the uncertainty of 
administrative and judicial outcome and the high cost 
of resolution are a disincentive to both innovators and 
competitors.”  CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1321 (concurring 
in part, dissenting in part).  Litigation costs are already 
high—according to studies, “software and business 
method patents account for nearly forty percent of the 
total cost of patent litigation and the problem is getting 
worse.”  Gerard N. Magliocca, Patenting the Curve 
Ball: Business Methods and Industry Norms, 2009 
BYU L. Rev. 875, 887 (2009).  Indeed, the cost of 
litigation for software and information technology 
patents often exceeds the profits of the patents.  See 
Bessen & Meurer, supra, at 15-16, 144.   
Section 101 “is virtually the only defensive 
mechanism left for repeat victims of software patent 
holdup.”  Brian J. Love, Why Patentable Subject 
Matter Matters for Software, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
Arguendo 1, 3 (2012).  Patent infringement litigation 
“defense costs are extremely high,” so plaintiffs “can 
often negotiate sizeable settlements” simply because 
the price is lower than the cost of discovery or 
defending a trial.  Id. at 10.  The current legal 
uncertainty and the effective elimination of § 101 as a 
screening device makes it easier for plaintiffs to 
extract unwarranted settlements.  And as the number 
of cases decided by the Federal Circuit in just the past 
few years illustrates, the question whether computer-
implemented methods are patentable arises frequently.  
As amici Google Inc. and Verizon Communications 
Inc. noted previously, this case “is an unusually clean 
vehicle” in which to address this issue and provide 
needed guidance.  Google Amicus Br. 13 (No. 11-962).  
The concept of trading advertisement viewing for 
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content is indisputably abstract.  App. 28a.  The court 
below recognized that formal claim construction was 
not necessary before resolving the § 101 issue 
presented here.  Id. at 29a-30a, 38a.  The claims at issue 
are based on technology that is easily understood—
indeed, virtually any Internet user is familiar with 
websites that require viewing advertisements before 
viewing content.  This case not only presents a 
computer-related method but one that applies to the 
Internet, a growing body of method patents.  Supra at 
31.  And the Federal Circuit’s decision in this case 
holding that the claims at issue are patent eligible 
under § 101 is written in sweeping terms and will all 
but eliminate the important role of § 101 in screening 
computer- and Internet-related patents. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of 
certiorari should be granted.   
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
 
ULTRAMERCIAL, INC. AND  
ULTRAMERCIAL, LLC, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
HULU, LLC, Defendant, AND WILDTANGENT, 
INC., Defendant-Appellee. 
2010-1544 
June 21, 2013, Decided 
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 12715 
Before RADER, Chief Judge, LOURIE and 
O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.  Opinion for the court 
filed by Chief Judge RADER.  Concurring opinion filed 
by Circuit Judge LOURIE. 
 
OPINION 
RADER, Chief Judge. 
The United States District Court for the Central 
District of California dismissed this patent suit, filed by 
Ultramercial, LLC and Ultramercial, Inc. (collectively, 
“Ultramercial”), by holding that U.S. Patent No. 
7,346,545 (“the ’545 patent”) does not claim patent-
eligible subject matter.  In an earlier decision, later 
vacated by the United States Supreme Court, this 
court reversed the district court’s holding and 
remanded.  Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 
1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. WildTangent, 
Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S.Ct. 2431, 182 L. Ed. 2d 
1059 (2012).  Because this court again holds that the 
district court erred in holding that the subject matter 
2a 
of the ’545 patent is not a “process” within the language 
and meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101, this court again 
reverses and remands. 
I. 
The ’545 patent claims a method for distributing 
copyrighted products (e.g., songs, movies, books) over 
the Internet where the consumer receives a 
copyrighted product for free in exchange for viewing 
an advertisement, and the advertiser pays for the 
copyrighted content.  Claim 1 of the ’545 patent reads: 
A method for distribution of products over the 
Internet via a facilitator, said method comprising 
the steps of: 
a first step of receiving, from a content 
provider, media products that are covered 
by intellectual property rights protection 
and are available for purchase, wherein 
each said media product being comprised of 
at least one of text data, music data, and 
video data; 
a second step of selecting a sponsor 
message to be associated with the media 
product, said sponsor message being 
selected from a plurality of sponsor 
messages, said second step including 
accessing an activity log to verify that the 
total number of times which the sponsor 
message has been previously presented is 
less than the number of transaction cycles 
contracted by the sponsor of the sponsor 
message; 
a third step of providing the media 
product for sale at an Internet website; 
3a 
a fourth step of restricting general public 
access to said media product; 
a fifth step of offering to a consumer 
access to the media product without charge 
to the consumer on the precondition that 
the consumer views the sponsor message; 
a sixth step of receiving from the 
consumer a request to view the sponsor 
message, wherein the consumer submits 
said request in response to being offered 
access to the media product; 
a seventh step of, in response to 
receiving the request from the consumer, 
facilitating the display of a sponsor 
message to the consumer; 
an eighth step of, if the sponsor message 
is not an interactive message, allowing said 
consumer access to said media product 
after said step of facilitating the display of 
said sponsor message; 
a ninth step of, if the sponsor message is 
an interactive message, presenting at least 
one query to the consumer and allowing 
said consumer access to said media product 
after receiving a response to said at least 
one query; 
a tenth step of recording the transaction 
event to the activity log, said tenth step 
including updating the total number of 
times the sponsor message has been 
presented; and 
an eleventh step of receiving payment 
from the sponsor of the sponsor message 
displayed. 
4a 
’545 patent col. 8, ll. 5-48. 
Ultramercial sued Hulu, LLC (“Hulu”), YouTube, 
LLC (“YouTube”), and WildTangent, Inc. 
(“WildTangent”), alleging infringement of the ’545 
patent. Hulu and YouTube have been dismissed from 
the case.  WildTangent moved to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim, arguing that the ’545 patent did not claim 
patent-eligible subject matter.  The district court 
granted WildTangent’s pre-answer motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6).  Ultramercial appeals. This court 
has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 
This court reviews a district court’s dismissal for 
failure to state a claim under the law of the regional 
circuit.  Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Shipley, 643 F.3d 
1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).  The 
Ninth Circuit reviews de novo challenges to a dismissal 
for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6). Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith 
Barney, Inc., 403 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2005).  This 
court also reviews the ultimate determination 
regarding patent-eligible subject matter under 35 
U.S.C. § 101 without deference.  In re Ferguson, 558 
F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
II. 
The district court dismissed Ultramercial’s claims 
for failure to claim statutory subject matter without 
formally construing the claims and, further, without 
requiring defendants to file answers.  This raises 
several preliminary issues. 
First, it will be rare that a patent infringement suit 
can be dismissed at the pleading stage for lack of 
patentable subject matter.  This is so because every 
issued patent is presumed to have been issued 
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properly, absent clear and convincing evidence to the 
contrary.  See, e.g., CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 
    F.3d     , 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9493, 2013 WL 
1920941, *33 (Fed. Cir. May 10, 2013) (Chief Judge 
Rader, and Judges Linn, Moore, and O’Malley, 
concluding that “any attack on an issued patent based 
on a challenge to the eligibility of the subject matter 
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence,” and 
Judges Lourie, Dyk, Prost, Reyna, and Wallach, 
concluding that a statutory presumption of validity 
applies when § 101 is raised as a basis for invalidity in 
district court proceedings.).  Further, if Rule 12(b)(6) is 
used to assert an affirmative defense, dismissal is 
appropriate only if the well-pleaded factual allegations 
in the complaint, construed in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiff, suffice to establish the defense.  See 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 
S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007); Jones v. Bock, 549 
U.S. 199, 215, 127 S. Ct. 910, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798 (2007).  
Thus, the only plausible reading of the patent must be 
that there is clear and convincing evidence of 
ineligibility.  For those reasons, Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal 
for lack of eligible subject matter will be the exception, 
not the rule. 
Second, as is shown more fully below, the analysis 
under § 101, while ultimately a legal determination, is 
rife with underlying factual issues.  For example, while 
members of this court have used varying formulations 
for the precise test, there is no doubt the § 101 inquiry 
requires a search for limitations in the claims that 
narrow or tie the claims to specific applications of an 
otherwise abstract concept.  CLS Bank,     F.3d     , 
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9493, 2013 WL 1920941 at *27-
30 (meaningful limitations); 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 
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9493, [WL] at *10 (opinion of Lourie, J.).  Further, 
factual issues may underlie determining whether the 
patent embraces a scientific principle or abstract idea.  
Id. (opinion of Lourie, J.) (“The underlying notion is 
that a scientific principle ... reveals a relationship that 
has always existed.”) (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 
U.S. 584, 593 n.15, 98 S. Ct. 2522, 57 L. Ed. 2d 451 
(1978)).  If the question is whether “genuine human 
contribution” is required, and that requires “more than 
a trivial appendix to the underlying abstract idea,” and 
were not at the time of filing “routine, well-understood, 
or conventional,” factual inquiries likely abound. 2013 
U.S. App. LEXIS 9493, [WL] at *11–12.  Almost by 
definition, analyzing whether something was 
“conventional” or “routine” involves analyzing facts. 
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9493, [WL] at *12.  Likewise, 
any inquiry into the scope of preemption—how much of 
the field is “tied up” by the claim—by definition will 
involve historic facts: identifying the “field,” the 
available alternatives, and preemptive impact of the 
claims in that field.  The presence of factual issues 
coupled with the requirement for clear and convincing 
evidence normally will render dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6) improper. 
Third, and in part because of the factual issues 
involved, claim construction normally will be required.  
This court has never set forth a bright line rule 
requiring district courts to construe claims before 
determining subject matter eligibility.  Indeed, because 
eligibility is a “coarse” gauge of the suitability of broad 
subject matter categories for patent protection, 
Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 
F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010), claim construction may 
not always be necessary for a § 101 analysis.  See, e.g., 
7a 
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231, 177 L. Ed. 2d 
792 (2010) (finding subject matter ineligible for patent 
protection without claim construction); CLS Bank, 
    F.3d     , 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9493, 2013 WL 
1920941 (court decided eligibility of subject matter 
without formal claim construction). 
On the other hand, if there are factual disputes, 
claim construction should be required.  The procedural 
posture of the case may indicate whether claim 
construction is required.  This case involves Rule 
12(b)(6), which requires courts to accept the well-
pleaded factual allegations as true and to require the 
accused infringer to establish that the only plausible 
reading of the claims is that, by clear and convincing 
evidence, they cover ineligible subject matter.  It may 
also be feasible for the district court to choose to 
construe the claims in accordance with this court’s 
precedent, or to adopt the construction proffered by 
the patentee.  In either case, it cannot decide factual 
questions at this stage.  At summary judgment, the 
district court may choose to construe the claims in 
accordance with this court’s precedent, or if not it may 
choose to give a construction most favorable to the 
patentee, and to apply the usual rules pertaining to 
summary judgment from there, and still require clear 
and convincing evidence of ineligible subject matter. 
Of course, even if not required, on many occasions a 
definition of the invention by claim construction can 
clarify the basic character of the subject matter of the 
invention.  Thus, claim meaning may clarify the actual 
subject matter at stake in the invention and can 
enlighten, or even answer, questions about subject 
matter abstractness.  In this procedural posture, 
however, the subject matter at stake and its eligibility 
8a 
does not require formal claim construction. 
Finally, fourth, the question of eligible subject 
matter must be determined on a claim-by-claim basis. 
Construing every asserted claim and then conducting a 
§ 101 analysis may not be a wise use of judicial 
resources. 
With these thoughts in mind, the court turns to the 
question of whether the court correctly dismissed the 
suit under § 101. 
III. 
A. 
The statute controls the inquiry into patentable 
subject matter.  35 U.S.C. § 101 sets forth the 
categories of subject matter that are eligible for patent 
protection: “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.”  (Emphasis added).  Underscoring its breadth, 
§ 101 both uses expansive categories and modifies them 
with the word “any.”  In Bilski, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that “[i]n choosing such expansive terms 
modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly 
contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide 
scope.”  130 S. Ct. at 3225 (quoting Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308, 100 S. Ct. 2204, 65 L. 
Ed. 2d 144 (1980)). 
The pertinent, expansive definition of “process” in 
§ 100(b) confirms the statute’s intended breadth.  At 
first examination, the Act’s definition of “process” to 
include a new use of a known machine seems 
superfluous.  After all, if “any” process may be 
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patented under § 101, § 100(b) seems wholly 
unnecessary.  The amendment was necessary to avoid 
narrow judicial interpretations of “process” given to 
the pre-1952 statute.  Specifically, the 1952 
amendments added § 100(b) to ensure that doubts 
about the scope of a “process” under the pre-1952 
version of the patent statute would not be read into the 
new Act. P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New 
Patent Act, reprinted in 75 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. 
Soc’y 161, 177 (1993) (“Remarks have appeared in a few 
decisions and elsewhere that new uses are not 
patentable ....  [I]f such remarks are interpreted to 
mean that a new use or application of an old machine ... 
cannot result in anything patentable then such 
statements are not and have never been an accurate 
statement of the law.”); Hearing Before Sub-comm. No. 
3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, at 37 (1951) (Federico 
testifying that the “definition of ‘process’ has been 
added ... to clarify the present law as to certain types of 
methods as to which some doubts have been expressed 
....”); S.Rep. No. 82–1979, at 17 (1952) (Explaining that 
the definition clarified that “processes or methods 
which involve merely the new use of a known process ... 
are processes or methods under the statute and may be 
patented provided the conditions of patentability are 
satisfied.”).  Thus, changes were made to the 1952 Act 
to broaden eligible subject matter and eliminate doubt 
caused by narrow interpretations given to the prior 
statute.  Moreover, not only did Congress expand the 
definition of “process” in 1952, Title 35 does not list a 
single ineligible category.  At a time when Congress 
considered § 101, it broadened the statute and certainly 
did not place any specific limits on it. 
The limited role of § 101 even in patentability (the 
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patentee did not argue that § 101 is not a defense to 
infringement) is confirmed by other aspects of the 
Patent Act.  As § 101 itself expresses, subject matter 
eligibility is merely a threshold check; patentability of a 
claim ultimately depends on “the conditions and 
requirements of this title,” such as novelty, non-
obviousness, and adequate disclosure. 35 U.S.C. § 101; 
see Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3225 (Characterizing § 101 as a 
“threshold test”); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. 
Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057,1064 (Fed. Cir.2011) 
(Pointing out the difference between “the threshold 
inquiry of patent-eligibility, and the substantive 
conditions of patentability”).  By directing attention to 
the substantive criteria for patentability, Congress 
made it clear that the categories of patent-eligible 
subject matter are no more than a “coarse eligibility 
filter.”  Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 869.  In other 
words, Congress made it clear that the expansive 
categories—process, machine, article of manufacture, 
and composition of matter—are not substitutes for the 
substantive patentability requirements set forth in 
§§ 102, 103, and 112 and invoked expressly by § 101 
itself.  After all, the purpose of the Patent Act is to 
encourage innovation, and the use of broadly inclusive 
categories of statutory subject matter ensures that 
“ingenuity ... receive[s] a liberal encouragement.” 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308.  The plain language of 
the statute provides that any new, non-obvious, and 
fully disclosed technical advance is eligible for 
protection. 
B. 
The Supreme Court has on occasion recognized 
narrow judicial exceptions to the 1952 Act’s 
deliberately broadened eligibility provisions.  In line 
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with the broadly permissive nature of § 101’s subject 
matter eligibility principles and the structure of the 
Patent Act, case law has recognized only three narrow 
categories of subject matter outside the eligibility 
bounds of § 101—laws of nature, physical phenomena, 
and abstract ideas.  Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225.  The 
Court’s motivation for recognizing exceptions to this 
broad statutory grant was its desire to prevent the 
“monopolization” of the “basic tools of scientific and 
technological work,” which “might tend to impede 
innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”  
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 
132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293, 182 L. Ed. 2d 321 (2012) 
(“Prometheus ”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Though recognizing these exceptions, the Court has 
also recognized that these implied exceptions are in 
obvious tension with the plain language of the statute, 
its history, and its purpose.  See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 
at 308 (“In choosing such expansive terms as 
‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ modified by 
the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly 
contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide 
scope.”); id. at 315 (“Broad general language is not 
necessarily ambiguous when congressional objectives 
require broad terms.”).  As the Supreme Court has 
made clear, too broad an interpretation of these 
exclusions from the grant in § 101 “could eviscerate 
patent law.”  Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1293; cf. Bilski, 
130 S. Ct. at 3226 (“This Court has not indicated that 
the existence of these well-established exceptions gives 
the Judiciary carte blanche to impose other limitations 
that are inconsistent with the text and the statute’s 
purpose and design.”). 
Thus, this court must not read § 101 so restrictively 
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as to exclude “unanticipated inventions” because the 
most beneficial inventions are “often unforeseeable.” 
See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 316; see also J.E.M. Ag 
Supply, 534 U.S. at 135 (describing § 101 as “a dynamic 
provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen 
inventions.”).  Broad inclusivity is the Congressional 
goal of § 101, not a flaw. 
To sum up, because eligibility requires assessing 
judicially recognized exceptions against a broad and 
deliberately expanded statutory grant, one of the 
principles that must guide our inquiry is these 
exceptions should apply narrowly.  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has cautioned that, to avoid improper 
restraints on statutory language, acknowledged 
exceptions thereto must be rare. 
C. 
In the eligibility analysis as well, the presumption 
of proper issuance applies to a granted patent.  As a 
practical matter, because judicially acknowledged 
exceptions could eviscerate the statute, application of 
this presumption and its attendant evidentiary burden 
is consistent with the Supreme Court’s admonition to 
cabin exceptions to § 101.  Further, applying the 
presumption is consistent with patent office practice. 
Before issuing a patent, the Patent Office rejects 
claims if they are drawn to ineligible subject matter, 
just as it rejects claims if not compliant with §§ 102, 
103, or 112.  With one exception, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions since 1952 have addressed the propriety of 
those decisions.  Thus, when a patent issues, it does so 
after the Patent Office assesses and endorses its 
eligibility under § 101, just as it assesses and endorses 
its patentability under the other provisions of Title 35. 
See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S.Ct. 2238, 
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2242, 180 L.Ed.2d 131, (2011) (“Congress has set forth 
the prerequisites for issuance of a patent, which the 
PTO must evaluate in the examination process.  To 
receive patent protection a claimed invention must, 
among other things, fall within one of the express 
categories of patentable subject matter, § 101, and be 
novel, § 102, and nonobvious, § 103.”). 
In sum, the high level of proof applies to eligibility 
as it does to the separate patentability determinations. 
Accordingly, any attack on an issued patent based on a 
challenge to the eligibility of the subject matter must 
be proven by clear and convincing evidence.  Cf. 
Microsoft, 31 S. Ct. at 2242 (“We consider whether 
§ 282 requires an invalidity defense to be proved by 
clear and convincing evidence.  We hold that it does.”). 
IV. 
A. 
Defining “abstractness” has presented difficult 
problems, particularly for the § 101 “process” category.  
Clearly, a process need not use a computer, or some 
machine, in order to avoid “abstractness.”  In this 
regard, the Supreme Court recently examined the 
statute and found that the ordinary, contemporary, 
common meaning of “method” may include even 
methods of doing business.  See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 
3228.  Accordingly, the Court refused to deem business 
methods ineligible for patent protection and cautioned 
against “read[ing] into the patent laws limitations and 
conditions which the legislature has not expressed.”  
Id. at 3226 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 
182, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1981)). 
In an effort to grapple with this non-statutory 
“abstractness” exception to “processes,” the dictionary 
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provides some help.  See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary 5 (11th ed. 2003) (defining abstract as 
“disassociated from any specific instance ... expressing 
a quality apart from an object <the word poem is 
concrete, poetry is [abstract]>”).  An abstract idea is 
one that has no reference to material objects or specific 
examples—i.e., it is not concrete.  This court at one 
point set forth a machine-or-transformation test as the 
exclusive metric for determining the subject matter 
eligibility of processes.  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 956 
(Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d on other grounds, Bilski, 130 S. 
Ct. 3218, 177 L. Ed. 2d 792.  The Supreme Court 
rejected this approach in Bilski, noting that the 
machine-or-transformation test is simply “a useful and 
important clue, an investigative tool, for determining 
whether some claimed inventions are processes under 
§ 101” and is not “the sole test for deciding whether an 
invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’ ”  130 S. Ct. at 
3227 (emphasis added).  While machine-or-
transformation logic served well as a tool to evaluate 
the subject matter of Industrial Age processes, that 
test has far less application to the inventions of the 
Information Age.  See id. at 3227-28 (“[I]n deciding 
whether previously unforeseen inventions qualify as 
patentable ‘processes,’ it may not make sense to 
require courts to confine themselves to asking the 
questions posed by the machine-or-transformation test. 
§ 101’s terms suggest that new technologies may call 
for new inquiries.”).  Technology without anchors in 
physical structures and mechanical steps simply defy 
easy classification under the machine-or-
transformation categories.  As the Supreme Court 
suggests, mechanically applying that physical test 
“risk[s] obscuring the larger object of securing patents 
for valuable inventions without transgressing the 
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public domain.”  Id. at 3227. 
Members of both the Supreme Court and this court 
have recognized the difficulty of providing a precise 
formula or definition for the abstract concept of 
abstractness.  See id. at 3236 (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(“The Court ... [has] never provide[d] a satisfying 
account of what constitutes an unpatentable abstract 
idea.”); Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 868.  Because 
technology is ever-changing and evolves in 
unforeseeable ways, this court gives substantial weight 
to the statutory reluctance to list any new, non-
obvious, and fully disclosed subject matter as beyond 
the reach of Title 35. 
B. 
A claim can embrace an abstract idea and be 
patentable.  See Prometheus, 132 S.Ct. at 1294 
(explaining that the fact that a claim uses a basic tool 
does not mean it is not eligible for patenting).  Instead, 
a claim is not patent eligible only if, instead of claiming 
an application of an abstract idea, the claim is instead 
to the abstract idea itself.  The inquiry here is to 
determine on which side of the line the claim falls:  does 
the claim cover only an abstract idea, or instead does 
the claim cover an application of an abstract idea?  See 
Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3230 (“[W]hile an abstract idea, law 
of nature, or mathematical formula could not be 
patented, an application of a law of nature or 
mathematical formula to a known structure or process 
may well be deserving of patent protection.” (emphasis 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67, 93 S. Ct. 253, 34 
L. Ed. 2d 273 (1972) (“He who discovers a hitherto 
unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a 
monopoly of it which the law recognizes.  If there is to 
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be invention from such a discovery, it must come from 
the application of the law of nature to a new and useful 
end.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187 (“It is now 
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or 
mathematical formula to a known structure or process 
may well be deserving of patent protection.”) 
In determining on which side of the line the claim 
falls, the court must focus on the claim as a whole.  As 
the Court explained: 
In determining the eligibility of respondents’ 
claimed process for patent protection under 
§ 101, their claims must be considered as a 
whole.  It is inappropriate to dissect the claims 
into old and new elements and then to ignore the 
presence of the old elements in the analysis.  
This is particularly true in a process claim 
because a new combination of steps in a process 
may be patentable even though all the 
constituents of the combination were well known 
and in common use before the combination was 
made. 
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (emphasis added).  The majority 
in Diehr rejected the minority’s approach ignoring 
portions of the claims: “[i]n order for the dissent to 
reach its conclusion it is necessary for it to read out of 
respondents’ patent application all the steps in the 
claimed process which it determined were not novel or 
‘inventive.’  That is not the purpose of the § 101 inquiry 
....”  Id. at 193 n. 15 (citations omitted); Aro Mfg. Co. v. 
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 345, 81 
S. Ct. 599, 5 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1961) (“[T]here is no legally 
recognizable or protected ‘essential’ element, ‘gist’ or 
‘heart’ of the invention.”). 
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The Court has long-recognized that any claim can 
be stripped down, simplified, generalized, or 
paraphrased to remove all of its concrete limitations, 
until at its core, something that could be characterized 
as an abstract idea is revealed.  A court cannot go 
hunting for abstractions by ignoring the concrete, 
palpable, tangible limitations of the invention the 
patentee actually claims. 
Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether a claim, as 
a whole, includes meaningful limitations restricting it 
to an application, rather than merely an abstract idea. 
See Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1297 (“[D]o the patent 
claims add enough to their statements of the 
correlations to allow the processes they describe to 
qualify as patent-eligible processes that apply natural 
laws?”); see also Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease 
LLC, 671 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]o impart 
patent-eligibility to an otherwise unpatentable process 
under the theory that the process is linked to a 
machine, the use of the machine must impose 
meaningful limits on the claim’s scope.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  For these reasons, a claim 
may be premised on an abstract idea and, indeed, the 
abstract idea may be of central importance to the 
invention—the question for patent eligibility is 
whether the claim contains limitations that 
meaningfully tie that abstract idea to an actual 
application of that idea through meaningful limitations. 
This analysis is not easy, but potentially wrought 
with the risk of subjectivity and hindsight evaluations. 
It also, as noted at the outset, often entails factual 
inquiries inappropriate on a motion directed to the 
pleadings.  Fortunately, the Supreme Court has 
provided some guideposts. 
18a 
An old example may be the most informative.  The 
claims in O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 14 L. 
Ed. 601 (1854), and a case described therein, illustrate 
the distinction between a patent ineligible abstract idea 
and a practical application of an idea.  The “difficulty” 
in Morse arose with the claim in which Morse: 
d[id] not propose to limit [him]self to the 
specific machinery or parts of machinery 
described in the ... specification and claims; the 
essence of [his] invention being the use of the 
motive power of the electric or galvanic current 
... however developed for marking or printing 
intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any 
distances .... 
Id. at 112 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In 
considering Morse’s claim, the Supreme Court referred 
to an earlier English case that distinguished ineligible 
claims to a “principle” from claims “applying” that 
principle: 
[I]t seems that the court at first doubted, 
whether it was a patent for anything more than 
the discovery that hot air would promote the 
ignition of fuel better than cold.  And if this had 
been the construction, the court, it appears, 
would have held his patent to be void; because 
the discovery of a principle in natural philosophy 
or physical science, is not patentable. 
But after much consideration, it was finally 
decided that this principle must be regarded as 
well known, and that the plaintiff had invented a 
mechanical mode of applying it to furnaces; and 
that his invention consisted in interposing a 
heated receptacle, between the blower and the 
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furnace, and by this means heating the air after 
it left the blower, and before it was thrown into 
the fire.  Whoever, therefore, used this method 
of throwing hot air into the furnace, used the 
process he had invented, and thereby infringed 
his patent, although the form of the receptacle or 
the mechanical arrangements for heating it, 
might be different from those described by the 
patentee. 
Id. at 116.  The claim in Morse itself was impermissible 
because it covered “ ‘an effect produced by the use of 
electro-magnetism, distinct from the process or 
machinery necessary to produce it.’ ”  The Telephone 
Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 534, 8 S. Ct. 778, 31 L. Ed. 863 (1888) 
(quoting Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 120).  This was in 
contrast to a sustained claim that was limited to: 
making use of the motive power of 
magnetism, when developed by the action of 
such current or currents, substantially as set 
forth in the ... description, ... as means of 
operating or giving motion to machinery, which 
may be used to imprint signals upon paper or 
other suitable material, or to produce sounds in 
any desired manner, for the purpose of 
telegraphic communication at any distances. 
Id. (first ellipsis added, second ellipsis in original) 
(quoting Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 85).  “ ‘The effect 
of [Morse ] was, therefore, that the use of magnetism 
as a motive power, without regard to the particular 
process with which it was connected in the patent, 
could not be claimed, but that its use in that connection 
could.’ ”  Benson, 409 U.S. at 68 (quoting The 
Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. at 534). 
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The concern underscoring Morse, which has become 
clearer through the Supreme Court’s more recent 
precedents, is to deny patentability to an idea itself, 
rather than an application of that idea.  The Court has 
provided some guidance on discerning when this should 
occur. 
First, the Supreme Court has stated that a claim is 
not meaningfully limited if it merely describes an 
abstract idea or simply adds “apply it.”  See 
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1294, 1297.  The broad claim 
in Morse provides a striking example of this.  We also 
know that, if a claim covers all practical applications of 
an abstract idea, it is not meaningfully limited.  See id. 
at 1301-02.  For example, “[a]llowing petitioners to 
patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of this 
approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a 
monopoly over an abstract idea.”  Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 
3231 (emphasis added).  While this concept is 
frequently referred to as “pre-emption,” it is important 
to remember that all patents “pre-empt” some future 
innovation in the sense that they preclude others from 
commercializing the invention without the patentee’s 
permission.  Pre-emption is only a subject matter 
eligibility problem when a claim pre-empts all practical 
uses of an abstract idea.  For example, the claims in 
Benson “purported to cover any use of the claimed 
method in a general-purpose digital computer of any 
type.”  409 U.S. at 64 (emphasis added).  The claims 
were not allowed precisely because they pre-empted 
essentially all uses of the idea: 
It is conceded that one may not patent an 
idea.  But in practical effect that would be the 
result if the formula for converting [binary-
coded decimal] numerals to pure binary 
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numerals were patented in this case.  The 
mathematical formula involved here has no 
substantial practical application except in 
connection with a digital computer, which means 
that ... the patent would wholly pre-empt the 
mathematical formula and in practical effect 
would be a patent on the algorithm itself. 
Id. at 71-72 (emphasis added).  When the steps of the 
claim “must be taken in order to apply the [abstract 
idea] in question,” the claim is essentially no different 
from saying apply the abstract idea.  Prometheus, 132 
S.Ct. at 1299-1300.  It is not the breadth or narrowness 
of the abstract idea that is relevant, but whether the 
claim covers every practical application of that abstract 
idea.1  As noted at the outset, whether a claim 
preempts “too much” will often require claim 
construction and factual inquiries. 
And, the Supreme Court has stated that, even if a 
claim does not wholly pre-empt an abstract idea, it still 
will not be limited meaningfully if it contains only 
insignificant or token pre- or post-solution activity—
such as identifying a relevant audience, a category of 
                                                 
1 The pre-emption analysis must also recognize that the 
Patent Act does not halt or impede academic research, without 
commercial ends, to test, confirm, or improve a patented 
invention.  See Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 
(C.C.D.Mass.1813) (No. 12,391) (Story, J.) (infringement does not 
occur when the invention is used “for the mere purpose of 
philosophical experiment, or to ascertain the verity and exactness 
of the specification”).  Further, Morse shows that a claim is not 
“abstract” merely because it is broad, because the “hot air” claims 
were broad and covered many “mechanical arrangements” but yet 
found patent eligible. 
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use, field of use, or technological environment.  See 
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1297-98, 1300-01; Bilski, 130 
S. Ct. at 3230-31; Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-92 & n.14; 
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 n.18, 98 S. Ct. 2522, 
57 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1978).  Again, these may involve 
factual inquiries. 
Finally, the Supreme Court has stated that a claim 
is not meaningfully limited if its purported limitations 
provide no real direction, cover all possible ways to 
achieve the provided result, or are overly-generalized. 
See Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1300 (“[S]imply 
appending conventional steps, specified at a high level 
of generality, to laws of nature, natural phenomena, 
and abstract ideas cannot make those laws, phenomena, 
and ideas patentable.”); Fort Props., 671 F.3d at 1323 
(“Such a broad and general limitation does not impose 
meaningful limits on the claim’s scope.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  For example, in 
Prometheus, “the ‘determining’ step tells the doctor to 
determine the level of the relevant metabolites in the 
blood, through whatever process the doctor or the 
laboratory wishes to use.”  132 S. Ct. at 1297.  Diehr 
explained that the application in Flook “did not purport 
to explain how these other variables were to be 
determined, nor did it purport to contain any disclosure 
relating to the chemical processes at work, the 
monitoring of process variables, or the means of setting 
off an alarm or adjusting an alarm system,” and that 
“[a]ll that it provides is a formula for computing an 
updated alarm limit.”  Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186-87 
(footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Just as the Supreme Court has indicated when a 
claim likely should not be deemed meaningfully limited, 
it has also given examples of meaningful limitations 
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which likely remove claims from the scope of the 
Court’s judicially created exceptions to § 101.  Thus, a 
claim is meaningfully limited if it requires a particular 
machine implementing a process or a particular 
transformation of matter.  See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227 
(“This Court’s precedents establish that the machine-
or-transformation test is a useful and important clue ... 
for determining whether some claimed inventions are 
processes under § 101.”); see also Prometheus, 132 
S.Ct. at 1302-03; Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184, 192.  A claim 
also will be limited meaningfully when, in addition to 
the abstract idea, the claim recites added limitations 
which are essential to the invention.  In those 
instances, the added limitations do more than recite 
pre- or post-solution activity, they are central to the 
solution itself.  And, in such circumstances, the abstract 
idea is not wholly pre-empted; it is only preempted 
when practiced in conjunction with the other necessary 
elements of the claimed invention.  See Diehr, 450 U.S. 
at 187 (“[T]he respondents here do not seek to patent a 
mathematical formula. Instead, they seek patent 
protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber. 
Their process admittedly employs a well-known 
mathematical equation, but they do not seek to pre-
empt the use of that equation.  Rather, they seek only 
to foreclose from others the use of that equation in 
conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed 
process.”); see also Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1298-99 
(discussing Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. 
Ed. 2d 155). 
In specifying what the scope of the abstract idea 
exception to patent eligibility is, it is also important to 
specify what the analysis is not.  Flook suggested that 
an abstract idea is to be “treated as though it were a 
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familiar part of the prior art.”  437 U.S. at 591-92.  
Prometheus used the language of “inventive concept” 
to describe the “other elements or a combination of 
elements ... sufficient to ensure that the patent in 
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent 
upon the natural law itself” and explain that purported 
limitations must be more than “routine” or 
“conventional” to confer patent eligibility.  132 S. Ct. at 
1294, 1298-99.  While these inquiries do require an 
understanding of what existed in the ken of those 
skilled in the art during the relevant time frame, 
principles of patent eligibility must not be conflated 
with those of validity, however. 
The Supreme Court repeatedly has cautioned 
against conflating the analysis of the conditions of 
patentability in the Patent Act with inquiries into 
patent eligibility.  See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 190 (“The 
question therefore of whether a particular invention is 
novel is wholly apart from whether the invention falls 
into a category of statutory subject matter.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also Prometheus, 132 S. 
Ct. at 1304 (recognizing that “to shift the patent-
eligibility inquiry entirely to [§§ 102, 103, and 112] risks 
creating significantly greater legal uncertainty, while 
assuming that those sections can do work that they are 
not equipped to do”).  Because a new combination of old 
steps is patentable, as is a new process using an old 
machine or composition, subject matter eligibility must 
exist even if it was obvious to use the old steps with 
the new machine or composition.  Otherwise the 
eligibility analysis ignores the text of §§ 101 and 100(b), 
and reads § 103 out of the Patent Act. 
In this regard, the Supreme Court’s reference to 
“inventiveness” in Prometheus can be read as 
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shorthand for its inquiry into whether implementing 
the abstract idea in the context of the claimed 
invention inherently requires the recited steps.  Thus, 
in Prometheus, the Supreme Court recognized that the 
additional steps were those that anyone wanting to use 
the natural law would necessarily use.  See 
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1298.  If, to implement the 
abstract concept, one must perform the additional step, 
or the step is a routine and conventional aspect of the 
abstract idea, then the step merely separately restates 
an element of the abstract idea, and thus does not 
further limit the abstract concept to a practical 
application.  Id. (“Anyone who wants to make use of 
these laws must first administer a thiopurine drug and 
measure the resulting metabolite concentrations, and 
so the combination amounts to nothing significantly 
more than an instruction to the doctor to apply the 
applicable laws when treating their patients.”) 
C. 
There are also additional guideposts specific to 
computer-implemented inventions.  When assessing 
computer implemented claims, while the mere 
reference to a general purpose computer will not save a 
method claim from being deemed too abstract to be 
patent eligible, the fact that a claim is limited by a tie 
to a computer is an important indication of patent 
eligibility.  See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.  This tie to a 
machine moves it farther away from a claim to the 
abstract idea itself.  Moreover, that same tie makes it 
less likely that the claims will pre-empt all practical 
applications of the idea. 
This inquiry focuses on whether the claims tie the 
otherwise abstract idea to a specific way of doing 
something with a computer, or a specific computer for 
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doing something; if so, they likely will be patent 
eligible.  On the other hand, claims directed to nothing 
more than the idea of doing that thing on a computer 
are likely to face larger problems.  While no particular 
type of limitation is necessary, meaningful limitations 
may include the computer being part of the solution, 
being integral to the performance of the method, or 
containing an improvement in computer technology.  
See SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 
1319, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting that “a machine,” 
a GPS receiver, was “integral to each of the claims at 
issue” and “place[d] a meaningful limit on the scope of 
the claims”).  A special purpose computer, i.e., a new 
machine, specially designed to implement a process 
may be sufficient.  See Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544 
(“Although many, or arguably even all, of the means 
elements recited in claim 15 represent circuitry 
elements that perform mathematical calculations, 
which is essentially true of all digital electrical circuits, 
the claimed invention as a whole is directed to a 
combination of interrelated elements which combine to 
form a machine for converting discrete waveform data 
samples into anti-aliased pixel illumination intensity 
data to be displayed on a display means.  This is not a 
disembodied mathematical concept which may be 
characterized as an ‘abstract idea,’ but rather a specific 
machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible 
result.” (footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 1545 (“We 
have held that such programming creates a new 
machine, because a general purpose computer in effect 
becomes a special purpose computer once it is 
programmed to perform particular functions pursuant 
to instructions from program software.”). 
At bottom, with a claim tied to a computer in a 
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specific way, such that the computer plays a 
meaningful role in the performance of the claimed 
invention, it is as a matter of fact not likely to pre-empt 
virtually all uses of an underlying abstract idea, leaving 
the invention patent eligible.  “[I]nventions with 
specific applications or improvements to technologies 
in the marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that 
they override the statutory language and framework of 
the Patent Act.”  Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 869. 
With this background, the court turns to the 
asserted claims here. 
VI. 
The district court did not construe the claims in 
accordance with this court’s precedent.  Instead, it held 
that there was no “reasonable construction” that would 
“bring the patent within patentable subject matter.”  
A. 6.  The district court erred in requiring the patentee 
to come forward with a construction that would show 
the claims were eligible.  That is presumed.  In this 
procedural posture, the district court should either 
have construed the claims in accordance with 
Markman, required the defendant to establish that the 
only plausible construction was one that, by clear and 
convincing evidence rendered the subject matter 
ineligible (with no factual inquiries), or adopted a 
construction most favorable to the patentee.  For 
purposes of this appeal, this court adopts the latter 
approach.  It may be that formal claim construction will 
still be required to determine the merits of eligibility. 
The district court held the asserted claim to be 
ineligible because it is “abstract.”  In this procedural 
posture, the complaint and the patent must by 
themselves show clear and convincing evidence that 
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the claim is not directed to an application of an abstract 
idea, but to a disembodied abstract idea itself.  See 
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; Parker, 437 U.S. at 591; 
Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67.  After all, unlike the 
Copyright Act which divides ideas from expression, the 
Patent Act covers and protects any new and useful 
technical advance, including applied ideas. 
The claimed invention is a method for monetizing 
and distributing copyrighted products over the 
Internet.  As a method, it easily satisfies § 100’s 
definition of “process” and thus falls within a § 101 
category of patent-eligible subject matter.  Thus, this 
court focuses on whether the claim is meaningfully 
limited to something less than an abstract idea that 
pre-empts use of an abstract concept. 
The parties proceed on the assumption that the 
mere idea that advertising can be used as a form of 
currency is abstract, just as the vague, unapplied 
concept of hedging proved patent-ineligible in Bilski. 
However, the ’545 patent does not simply claim the 
age-old idea that advertising can serve as currency. 
Instead, for the following reasons, the court holds that 
the district court erred in holding that the ’545 patent 
does not claim a practical application of this concept.2 
                                                 
2 When assessing the abstract idea exception, the § 101 
inquiry is a two-step one: first, whether the claim involves an 
intangible abstract idea; and if so, whether meaningful limitations 
in the claim make it clear that the claim is not to the abstract idea 
itself, but to a nonroutine and specific application of that idea.  
Because the parties here focus only on the second step, we do as 
well.  We note, however, that it is arguable that we are not even 
dealing with an intangible abstraction in the first instance; the 
claims relate to things that people do, not to mere mental steps. 
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The ’545 patent seeks to remedy problems with 
prior art banner advertising over the Internet, such as 
declining click-through rates, by introducing a method 
of product distribution that forces consumers to view 
and possibly even interact with advertisements before 
permitting access to the desired media product.  ’545 
patent col. 2, ll.14-18.  By its terms, the claimed 
invention purports to improve existing technology in 
the marketplace.  By its terms, the claimed invention 
invokes computers and applications of computer 
technology. 
Specifically, the ’545 patent claims a particular 
internet and computer-based method for monetizing 
copyrighted products, consisting of the following steps: 
(1) receiving media products from a copyright holder, 
(2) selecting an advertisement to be associated with 
each media product, (3) providing said media products 
for sale on an Internet website, (4) restricting general 
public access to the media products, (5) offering free 
access to said media products on the condition that the 
consumer view the advertising, (6) receiving a request 
from a consumer to view the advertising, (7) facilitating 
the display of advertising and any required interaction 
with the advertising, (8) allowing the consumer access 
to the associated media product after such display and 
interaction, if any, (9) recording this transaction in an 
activity log, and (10) receiving payment from the 
advertiser.  ’545 patent col. 8, ll. 5-48.  This court does 
not need the record of a formal claim construction to 
see that many of these steps require intricate and 
                                                 
Because the district court did not enter judgment on that ground 
and the parties do not brief it, we decline to address this 
alternative ground upon which this matter might be resolved. 
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complex computer programming. 
Even at this general level, it wrenches meaning 
from the word to label the claimed invention 
“abstract.”  The claim does not cover the use of 
advertising as currency disassociated with any specific 
application of that activity.  It was error for the district 
court to strip away these limitations and instead 
imagine some “core” of the invention.  A. 6. 
Further, and even without formal claim 
construction, it is clear that several steps plainly 
require that the method be performed through 
computers, on the internet, and in a cyber-market 
environment.  One clear example is the third step, 
“providing said media products for sale on an Internet 
website.”  Id. col. 8, ll. 20-21.  And, of course, if the 
products are offered for sale on the Internet, they must 
be “restricted”—step four—by complex computer 
programming as well. 
In addition, Figure 1, alone, demonstrates that the 
claim is not to some disembodied abstract idea but is 
instead a specific application of a method implemented 
by several computer systems, operating in tandem, 
over a communications network: 
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Almost all of the steps in this process, as explained 
in the flow chart of Figure 2, are tied to computer 
implementation: 
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Viewing the subject matter as a whole, the 
invention involves an extensive computer interface. 
Unlike Morse, the claims are not made without regard 
to a particular process.  Likewise, it does not say “sell 
advertising using a computer,” and so there is no risk 
of preempting all forms of advertising, let alone 
advertising on the Internet.  Further, the record at this 
stage shows no evidence that the recited steps are all 
token pre- or post-solution steps.  Finally, the claim 
appears far from over generalized, with eleven 
separate and specific steps with many limitations and 
sub-steps in each category.  The district court 
improperly made a subjective evaluation that these 
limitations did not meaningfully limit the “abstract idea 
at the core” of the claims.  A. 6. 
Having said that, this court does not define the 
level of programming complexity required before a 
computer-implemented method can be patent-eligible. 
Nor does this court hold that use of an Internet 
website to practice such a method is either necessary 
or sufficient in every case to satisfy § 101.  This court 
simply holds the claims in this case to be patent-
eligible, in this posture, in part because of these 
factors. 
In this context, this court examines as well the 
contention that the software programming necessary 
to facilitate the invention deserves no patent protection 
or amounts to abstract subject matter or, in the 
confusing terminology of machines and physical 
transformations, fails to satisfy the “particular 
machine” requirement.  This court confronted that 
contention nearly two decades ago in In re Alappat, 33 
F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir.1994) (en banc).  At that time, this 
court observed that “programming creates a new 
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machine, because a general purpose computer in effect 
becomes a special purpose computer once it is 
programmed to perform particular functions pursuant 
to instructions from program software.”  Id. at 1545.  
As computer scientists understand: 
[T]he inventor can describe the invention in 
terms of a dedicated circuit or a process that 
emulates that circuit.  Indeed, the line of 
demarcation between a dedicated circuit and a 
computer algorithm accomplishing the identical 
task is frequently blurred and is becoming 
increasingly so as the technology develops.  In 
this field, a software process is often 
interchangeable with a hardware circuit. 
Id. at 1583 (Rader, J., concurring).  In other words, a 
programmed computer contains circuitry unique to 
that computer.  That “new machine” could be claimed 
in terms of a complex array of hardware circuits, or 
more efficiently, in terms of the programming that 
facilitates a unique function.  With the digital 
computer, considered by some the greatest invention of 
the twentieth century, as a vital invention, both this 
court and the Patent Office have long acknowledged 
that “improvements thereof” through interchangeable 
software or hardware enhancements deserve patent 
protection.  Far from abstract, advances in computer 
technology—both hardware and software—drive 
innovation in every area of scientific and technical 
endeavor. 
The court also notes that the claims in this case are 
not highly generalized. Instead, the ten specific steps in 
the claim limit any abstract concept within the scope of 
the invention.  Further, common sense alone 
establishes that these steps are not inherent in the idea 
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of monetizing advertising.  There are myriad ways to 
accomplish that abstract concept that do not infringe 
these claims. 
This court understands that the broadly claimed 
method in the ’545 patent does not specify a particular 
mechanism for delivering media content to the 
consumer (i.e., FTP downloads, email, or real-time 
streaming).  This breadth and lack of specificity does 
not render the claimed subject matter impermissibly 
abstract.  Assuming the patent provides sufficient 
disclosure to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art 
to practice the invention and to satisfy the written 
description requirement, the disclosure need not detail 
the particular instrumentalities for each step in the 
process. 
That a process may be patentable, 
irrespective of the particular form of the 
instrumentalities used, cannot be disputed.  If 
one of the steps of a process be that a certain 
substance is to be reduced to a powder, it may 
not be at all material what instrument or 
machinery is used to effect that object, whether 
a hammer, a pestle and mortar, or a mill. 
Benson, 409 U.S. at 69-70 (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 
94 U.S. 780, 787-88, 24 L. Ed. 139, 1877 Dec. Comm’r 
Pat. 242 (1876)).  Moreover, written description and 
enablement are conditions for patentability that Title 
35 sets “wholly apart from whether the invention falls 
into a category of statutory subject matter.”  Diehr, 
450 U.S. at 190 (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 
(C.C.P.A. 1979)).  The “coarse eligibility filter” of § 101 
is not the statutory tool to address concerns about 
vagueness, indefinite disclosure, or lack of enablement, 
as these infirmities are expressly addressed by § 112.  
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See 35 U.S.C. § 112; see also Research Corp., 627 F.3d 
at 869 (“In § 112, the Patent Act provides powerful 
tools to weed out claims that may present a vague or 
indefinite disclosure of the invention.”). 
Finally, the ’545 patent does not claim a 
mathematical algorithm, a series of purely mental 
steps, or any similarly abstract concept.  It claims a 
particular method for collecting revenue from the 
distribution of media products over the Internet.  In a 
recent case, this court discerned that an invention 
claimed an “unpatentable mental process.”  
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 
1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  Unlike the claims in 
CyberSource, the claims here require, among other 
things, controlled interaction with a consumer over an 
Internet website, something far removed from purely 
mental steps. 
In sum, as a practical application of the general 
concept of advertising as currency and an improvement 
to prior art technology, the claimed invention is not “so 
manifestly abstract as to override the statutory 
language of section 101.”  Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 
869.  Accordingly, this court reverses the district 
court’s dismissal of Ultramercial’s patent claims for 
lack of subject matter eligibility and remands for 
further proceedings.  This decision does not opine at all 
on the patentability of the claimed invention under the 
substantive criteria set forth in §§ 102, 103, and 112. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED 
CONCUR BY:  LOURIE 
LOURIE, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I 
write separately because I believe that we should 
concisely and faithfully follow the Supreme Court’s 
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most recent guidance regarding patent eligibility in 
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 182 L. Ed. 2d 321 
(2012), and should track the plurality opinion of five 
judges from this court in CLS Bank International v. 
Alice Corp.,     F.3d     , 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9493, 
2013 WL 1920941, at *1-20 (Fed. Cir. May 10, 2013) 
(Lourie, Dyk, Prost, Reyna, & Wallach, JJ., plurality 
opinion).  It is our obligation to attempt to follow the 
Supreme Court’s guidance in Mayo rather than to set 
forth our own independent views, however valid we 
may consider them to be.  Indeed, this appeal was 
specifically vacated by the Supreme Court and 
remanded for further consideration in light of Mayo.  
WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S.Ct. 
2431, 182 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2012). 
The claims at issue in this appeal are method claims, 
not machine claims, and both Mayo and CLS Bank 
dealt squarely with the issue of patent eligibility of 
method claims.  The plurality opinion in CLS Bank 
identified a two-step process, derived from Mayo, for 
analyzing patent eligibility under § 101.  First, a court 
must identify “whether the claimed invention fits 
within one of the four statutory classes set out in 
§ 101.”  CLS Bank, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9493, 2013 
WL 1920941, at *9.  Second, one must assess whether 
any of the judicial exceptions to subject-matter 
eligibility apply, including whether the claims are to 
patent-ineligible abstract ideas.  Id. 
In the case of abstractness, as discussed in CLS 
Bank, we must determine whether the claim poses 
“any risk of preempting an abstract idea.”  Id.  To do so 
we must first “identify and define whatever 
fundamental concept appears wrapped up in the claim”; 
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a claim construction may be helpful in this analysis.  Id.  
Then, proceeding with the preemption analysis, the 
balance of the claim is evaluated to determine whether 
“additional substantive limitations ... narrow, confine, 
or otherwise tie down the claim so that, in practical 
terms, it does not cover the full abstract idea itself.”  
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9493, [WL] at *10 (citing Mayo, 
132 S.Ct. at 1300; Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 
3231, 177 L. Ed. 2d 792 (2010); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 
U.S. 175, 187, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1981)). 
Following this procedure, we are then ready to 
evaluate the claims at issue in this case. 
I agree with the majority that no formal claim 
construction is needed to interpret the claims at this 
stage.  See Majority Op. at 27.  As the majority 
correctly notes, the ’545 patent “claims a particular 
method for collecting revenue from the distribution of 
media products over the Internet” and, as a process, 
“falls within a category of patent-eligible subject 
matter.”  Majority Op. at 25-26.  The abstract idea at 
the heart of the ’545 patent, which the district court 
properly identified, is “us[ing] advertising as an 
exchange or currency.”  Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, 
LLC, No. CV 09-06918 RGK, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
93453, 2010 WL 3360098, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug.13, 2010). 
The ’545 patent claims, however, require more than 
just that abstract idea as part of the claimed method. 
The additional claim limitations reciting how that 
idea is implemented “narrow, confine, or otherwise tie 
down the claim so that, in practical terms, it does not 
cover the full abstract idea itself.”  CLS Bank, 2013 
U.S. App. LEXIS 9493, 2013 WL 1920941, at *10. 
While a computer or complex computer program, as 
discussed by the majority opinion, may be necessary to 
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perform the method, it is not what the claim 
specifically requires and thus should not be the focus of 
the analysis.  Likewise, although the number of claim 
limitations is also not an indication of patent-eligibility, 
unlike the method claims in CLS Bank, in my view, the 
added limitations in these claims represent 
significantly more than the underlying abstract idea of 
using advertising as an exchange or currency and, as a 
consequence, do not preempt the use of that idea in all 
fields.  See CLS Bank, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9493, 
2013 WL 1920941, at *15.  Thus, under the CLS Bank 
plurality analysis, I agree with the majority that the 
district court erred in dismissing Ultramercial’s claims 
for lack of subject matter eligibility under § 101 due to 
abstractness. 
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ULTRAMERCIAL, LLC and Ultramercial, Inc., 
Plaintiffs–Appellants, 
v. 
HULU, LLC, Defendant, 
and 
WildTangent, Inc., Defendant–Appellee. 
No. 2010-1544 
Sept. 15, 2011. 
657 F.3d 1323 
Before RADER, Chief Judge, LOURIE and 
O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges. 
RADER, Chief Judge. 
The United States District Court for the Central 
District of California dismissed Ultramercial, LLC and 
Ultramercial, Inc.’s (collectively, “Ultramercial”) 
patent infringement claims, finding that U.S. Patent 
No. 7,346,545 (“the ’545 patent”) does not claim patent-
eligible subject matter.  Because the ’545 patent claims 
a “process” within the language and meaning of 35 
U.S.C. § 101, this court reverses and remands. 
I 
The ’545 patent claims a method for distributing 
copyrighted products (e.g., songs, movies, books) over 
the Internet where the consumer receives a 
copyrighted product for free in exchange for viewing 
an advertisement, and the advertiser pays for the 
copyrighted content.  Claim 1 of the ’545 patent reads:  
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A method for distribution of products over the 
Internet via a facilitator, said method comprising 
the steps of:  
a first step of receiving, from a content provider, 
media products that are covered by 
intellectual property rights protection and are 
available for purchase, wherein each said 
media product being comprised of at least one 
of text data, music data, and video data; 
a second step of selecting a sponsor message to 
be associated with the media product, said 
sponsor message being selected from a 
plurality of sponsor messages, said second 
step including accessing an activity log to 
verify that the total number of times which 
the sponsor message has been previously 
presented is less than the number of 
transaction cycles contracted by the sponsor 
of the sponsor message;  
a third step of providing the media product for 
sale at an Internet website;  
a fourth step of restricting general public access 
to said media product;  
a fifth step of offering to a consumer access to 
the media product without charge to the 
consumer on the precondition that the 
consumer views the sponsor message;  
a sixth step of receiving from the consumer a 
request to view the sponsor message, wherein 
the consumer submits said request in 
response to being offered access to the media 
product;  
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a seventh step of, in response to receiving the 
request from the consumer, facilitating the 
display of a sponsor message to the consumer;  
an eighth step of, if the sponsor message is not 
an interactive message, allowing said 
consumer access to said media product after 
said step of facilitating the display of said 
sponsor message; 
a ninth step of, if the sponsor message is an 
interactive message, presenting at least one 
query to the consumer and allowing said 
consumer access to said media product after 
receiving a response to said at least one 
query;  
a tenth step of recording the transaction event 
to the activity log, said tenth step including 
updating the total number of times the 
sponsor message has been presented; and  
an eleventh step of receiving payment from the 
sponsor of the sponsor message displayed. 
’545 patent col.8 ll.5–48. 
Ultramercial filed suit against Hulu, LLC (“Hulu”), 
YouTube, LLC (“YouTube”), and WildTangent, Inc. 
(“WildTangent”), alleging infringement of the ’545 
patent. Hulu and YouTube have been dismissed from 
the case.  WildTangent filed a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim, arguing that the ’545 patent did 
not claim patent-eligible subject matter.  The district 
court granted WildTangent’s motion to dismiss. 
Ultramercial appeals.  This court has jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).  
This court reviews a district court’s dismissal for 
failure to state a claim without deference. Gillig v. 
Nike, Inc., 602 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  This 
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court also reviews determinations regarding patent-
eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 without 
deference.  In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1363 
(Fed.Cir.2009). 
II 
The district court dismissed Ultramercial’s claims 
for failure to claim statutory subject matter without 
formally construing the claims.  This court has never 
set forth a bright line rule requiring district courts to 
construe claims before determining subject matter 
eligibility.  Indeed, because eligibility is a “coarse” 
gauge of the suitability of broad subject matter 
categories for patent protection, Research Corp. 
Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 
(Fed.Cir.2010), claim construction may not always be 
necessary for a § 101 analysis.  See, e.g., Bilski v. 
Kappos, —U.S.—, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231, 177 L.Ed.2d 
792 (2010) (finding subject matter ineligible for patent 
protection without claim construction).  On many 
occasions, however, a definition of the invention via 
claim construction can clarify the basic character of the 
subject matter of the invention.  Thus, claim meaning 
may clarify the actual subject matter at stake in the 
invention and can enlighten, or even answer, questions 
about subject matter abstractness.  In this case, the 
subject matter at stake and its eligibility does not 
require claim construction. 
III 
35 U.S.C. § 101 sets forth the categories of subject 
matter that are eligible for patent protection: 
“[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 
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may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions 
and requirements of this title” (emphasis added).  In 
Bilski, the Supreme Court explained that “[i]n 
choosing such expansive terms modified by the 
comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated 
that the patent laws would be given wide scope.”  130 
S. Ct. at 3225 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. 303, 308, 100 S.Ct. 2204, 65 L.Ed.2d 144 (1980)).  
After all, the purpose of the Patent Act is to encourage 
innovation, and the use of broadly inclusive categories 
of statutory subject matter ensures that “ingenuity . . . 
receive[s] a liberal encouragement.”  Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. at 308, 100 S.Ct. 2204. 
More importantly, as § 101 itself expresses, subject 
matter eligibility is merely a threshold check; claim 
patentability ultimately depends on “the conditions and 
requirements of this title,” such as novelty, non-
obviousness, and adequate disclosure.  35 U.S.C. § 101; 
see Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 
659 F.3d 1057, 1064 (Fed.Cir.2011) (pointing out the 
difference between “the threshold inquiry of patent-
eligibility, and the substantive conditions of 
patentability”).  By directing attention to these 
substantive criteria for patentability, the language of 
§ 101 makes clear that the categories of patent-eligible 
subject matter are no more than a “coarse eligibility 
filter.”  Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 869.  In other 
words, the expansive categories—process, machine, 
article of manufacture, and composition of matter—are 
certainly not substitutes for the substantive 
patentability requirements set forth in § 102, § 103, and 
§ 112 and invoked expressly by § 101 itself.  Moreover, 
title 35 does not list a single ineligible category, 
suggesting that any new, non-obvious, and fully 
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disclosed technical advance is eligible for protection, 
subject to the following limited judicially created 
exceptions.  
In line with the broadly permissive nature of § 101’s 
subject matter eligibility principles, judicial case law 
has created only three categories of subject matter 
outside the eligibility bounds of § 101—laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.  Bilski, 130 
S.Ct. at 3225.  Indeed, laws of nature and physical 
phenomena cannot be invented.  Abstractness, 
however, has presented a different set of interpretive 
problems, particularly for the § 101 “process” category. 
Actually, the term “process” has a statutory definition 
that, again, admits of no express subject matter 
limitation: a title 35 “process” is a “process, art or 
method, and includes a new use of a known process, 
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or 
material.”  35 U.S.C. § 100(b).  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court recently examined this definition and found that 
the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of 
“method” may include even methods of doing business.  
See Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3228.  Accordingly, the Court 
refused to deem business methods ineligible for patent 
protection and cautioned against “read[ing] into the 
patent laws limitations and conditions which the 
legislature has not expressed.”  Id. at 3226 (quoting 
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 
L.Ed.2d 155 (1981)).  And this court detects no 
limitations or conditions on subject matter eligibility 
expressed in statutory language.  See, e.g., Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1348 (Fed.Cir.2011) (patent-
ineligible categories of subject matter are “judicially 
created exceptions”); Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo 
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Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1353 
(Fed.Cir.2010), cert. granted, —U.S.—, 130 S.Ct. 3543, 
177 L.Ed.2d 1120 (2010) (patent-ineligible categories 
are “not compelled by the statutory text”); see also 
Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3225 (Supreme Court 
acknowledging that judge-created “exceptions are not 
required by the statutory text”). 
In an effort to grapple with the non-statutory 
“abstractness” limit, this court at one point set forth a 
machine-or-transformation test as the exclusive metric 
for determining the subject matter eligibility of 
processes.  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 956 
(Fed.Cir.2008), aff’d on other grounds, Bilski, 130 S.Ct. 
3218. The Supreme Court rejected this approach in 
Bilski, noting that the machine-or-transformation test 
is simply “a useful and important clue, an investigative 
tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions 
are processes under § 101” and is not “the sole test for 
deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible 
‘process.’”  130 S.Ct. at 3227 (emphasis added).  While 
machine-or-transformation logic served well as a tool to 
evaluate the subject matter of Industrial Age 
processes, that test has far less application to the 
inventions of the Information Age.  See id. at 3227–28 
(“[I]n deciding whether previously unforeseen 
inventions qualify as patentable ‘processes,’ it may not 
make sense to require courts to confine themselves to 
asking the questions posed by the machine-or-
transformation test.  Section 101’s terms suggest that 
new technologies may call for new inquiries.”). 
Technology without anchors in physical structures and 
mechanical steps simply defy easy classification under 
the machine-or-transformation categories.  As the 
Supreme Court suggests, mechanically applying that 
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physical test “risk[s] obscuring the larger object of 
securing patents for valuable inventions without 
transgressing the public domain.”  Id. at 3228. 
Both members of the Supreme Court and this court 
have recognized the difficulty of providing a precise 
formula or definition for the judge-made ineligible 
category of abstractness.  See id. at 3236 (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (“The Court . . . [has] never provide[d] a 
satisfying account of what constitutes an unpatentable 
abstract idea.”); Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 868. 
Because technology is ever-changing and evolves in 
unforeseeable ways, this court gives substantial weight 
to the statutory reluctance to list any new, non-
obvious, and fully disclosed subject matter as beyond 
the reach of title 35.  In sum, § 101 is a “dynamic 
provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen 
inventions.”  J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-
Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 135, 122 S.Ct. 593, 151 
L.Ed.2d 508 (2001).  With this in mind, this court does 
“not presume to define ‘abstract’ beyond the 
recognition that this disqualifying characteristic should 
exhibit itself so manifestly as to override the broad 
statutory categories of eligible subject matter and the 
statutory context that directs primary attention on the 
patentability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act.”  
Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 868.  
Although abstract principles are not eligible for 
patent protection, an application of an abstract idea 
may well be deserving of patent protection.  See Diehr, 
450 U.S. at 187, 101 S.Ct. 1048 (“an application of a law 
of nature or mathematical formula to a known 
structure or process may well be deserving of patent 
protection”); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591, 98 
S.Ct. 2522, 57 L.Ed.2d 451 (1978) (“While a scientific 
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truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a 
patentable invention, a novel and useful structure 
created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth 
may be.”).  The application of an abstract idea to a “new 
and useful end” is the type of invention that the 
Supreme Court has described as deserving of patent 
protection.  Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67, 94 
S.Ct. 253, 34 L.Ed.2d 273 (1972).  After all, unlike the 
Copyright Act which divides idea from expression, the 
Patent Act covers and protects any new and useful 
technical advance, including applied ideas.  
Turning to the ’545 patent, the claimed invention is 
a method for monetizing and distributing copyrighted 
products over the Internet.  As a method, it satisfies 
§ 100’s definition of “process” and thus falls within a 
§ 101 category of patent-eligible subject matter.  Thus, 
this court focuses its inquiry on the abstractness of the 
subject matter claimed by the ’545 patent.  
“[I]nventions with specific applications or 
improvements to technologies in the marketplace are 
not likely to be so abstract that they override the 
statutory language and framework of the Patent Act.”  
Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 869.  The ’545 patent seeks 
to remedy problems with prior art banner advertising, 
such as declining click-through rates, by introducing a 
method of product distribution that forces consumers 
to view and possibly even interact with advertisements 
before permitting access to the desired media product. 
’545 patent col.2 ll.14–18.  By its terms, the claimed 
invention purports to improve existing technology in 
the marketplace.  By its terms, the claimed invention 
invokes computers and applications of computer 
technology.  Of course, the patentability of the ’545 
patent, though acknowledged by the U.S. Patent 
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Office, would still need to withstand challenges that the 
claimed invention does not advance technology 
(novelty), does not advance technology sufficiently to 
warrant patent protection (obviousness), or does not 
sufficiently enable, describe, and disclose the limits of 
the invention (adequate disclosure).  
Returning to the subject matter of the ’545 patent, 
the mere idea that advertising can be used as a form of 
currency is abstract, just as the vague, unapplied 
concept of hedging proved patent-ineligible in Bilski.  
However, the ’545 patent does not simply claim the 
age-old idea that advertising can serve as currency. 
Instead the ’545 patent discloses a practical application 
of this idea.  The ’545 patent claims a particular method 
for monetizing copyrighted products, consisting of the 
following steps: (1) receiving media products from a 
copyright holder, (2) selecting an advertisement to be 
associated with each media product, (3) providing said 
media products for sale on an Internet website, (4) 
restricting general public access to the media products, 
(5) offering free access to said media products on the 
condition that the consumer view the advertising, (6) 
receiving a request from a consumer to view the 
advertising, (7) facilitating the display of advertising 
and any required interaction with the advertising, (8) 
allowing the consumer access to the associated media 
product after such display and interaction, if any, (9) 
recording this transaction in an activity log, and (10) 
receiving payment from the advertiser.  ’545 patent 
col.8 ll.5–48.  Many of these steps are likely to require 
intricate and complex computer programming.  In 
addition, certain of these steps clearly require specific 
application to the Internet and a cyber-market 
environment.  One clear example is the third step, 
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“providing said media products for sale on an Internet 
website.”  Id. col.8 ll.20–21.  And, of course, if the 
products are offered for sale on the Internet, they must 
be “restricted”—step four—by complex computer 
programming as well.  Viewing the subject matter as a 
whole, the invention involves an extensive computer 
interface.  This court does not define the level of 
programming complexity required before a computer-
implemented method can be patent-eligible.  Nor does 
this court hold that use of an Internet website to 
practice such a method is either necessary or sufficient 
in every case to satisfy § 101.  This court simply find 
the claims here to be patent-eligible, in part because of 
these factors.  
In this context, this court examines as well the 
contention that the software programming necessary 
to facilitate the invention deserves no patent protection 
or amounts to abstract subject matter or, in the 
confusing terminology of machines and physical 
transformations, fails to satisfy the “particular 
machine” requirement.  This court confronted that 
contention nearly two decades ago in the en banc case 
of In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  At that 
time, this court observed that “programming creates a 
new machine, because a general purpose computer in 
effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is 
programmed to perform particular functions pursuant 
to instructions from program software.”  Id. at 1545.  
As computer scientists understand:  
the inventor can describe the invention in terms 
of a dedicated circuit or a process that emulates 
that circuit.  Indeed, the line of demarcation 
between a dedicated circuit and a computer 
algorithm accomplishing the identical task is 
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frequently blurred and is becoming increasingly 
so as the technology develops.  In this field, a 
software process is often interchangeable with a 
hardware circuit. 
Id. at 1583 (J. Rader, concurring).  In other words, a 
programmed computer contains circuitry unique to 
that computer.  That “new machine” could be claimed 
in terms of a complex array of hardware circuits, or 
more efficiently, in terms of the programming that 
facilitates a unique function.  The digital computer may 
be considered by some the greatest invention of the 
twentieth century, and both this court and the Patent 
Office have long acknowledged that “improvements 
thereof” through inter-changeable software or 
hardware enhancements deserve patent protection.  
Far from abstract, advances in computer technology—
both hardware and software—drive innovation in 
every area of scientific and technical endeavor.  
This court understands that the broadly claimed 
method in the ’545 patent does not specify a particular 
mechanism for delivering media content to the 
consumer (i.e., FTP downloads, email, or real-time 
streaming).  This breadth and lack of specificity does 
not render the claimed subject matter impermissibly 
abstract.  Assuming the patent provides sufficient 
disclosure to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art 
to practice the invention and to satisfy the written 
description requirement, the disclosure need not detail 
the particular instrumentalities for each step in the 
process.  
That a process may be patentable, irrespective of 
the particular form of the instrumentalities used, 
cannot be disputed.  If one of the steps of a 
process be that a certain substance is to be 
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reduced to a powder, it may not be at all material 
what instrument or machinery is used to effect 
that object, whether a hammer, a pestle and 
mortar, or a mill.  
Benson, 409 U.S. at 69-70, 93 S.Ct. 253 (quoting 
Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787–88, 24 L.Ed. 139 
(1876)).  Moreover, written description and enablement 
are conditions for patentability that title 35 sets 
“wholly apart from whether the invention falls into a 
category of statutory subject matter.”  Diehr, 450 U.S. 
at 190, 101 S.Ct. 1048 (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 
952, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1979)).  The “coarse eligibility filter” 
of § 101 should not be used to invalidate patents based 
on concerns about vagueness, indefinite disclosure, or 
lack of enablement, as these infirmities are expressly 
addressed by § 112.  See 35 U.S.C. § 112; see also 
Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 869 (“In section 112, the 
Patent Act provides powerful tools to weed out claims 
that may present a vague or indefinite disclosure of the 
invention.”).  
Finally, the ’545 patent does not claim a 
mathematical algorithm, a series of purely mental 
steps, or any similarly abstract concept.  It claims a 
particular method for collecting revenue from the 
distribution of media products over the Internet.  In a 
recent case, this court discerned that an invention 
claimed an “unpatentable mental process.” 
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 
1366, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2011). The eligibility exclusion for 
purely mental steps is particularly narrow.  See 
Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d at 1358 (noting that claims 
must be considered as a whole and that “the presence 
of mental steps [in a claim] does not detract from the 
patentability of [other] steps”).  Unlike the claims in 
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CyberSource, the claims here require, among other 
things, controlled interaction with a consumer via an 
Internet website, something far removed from purely 
mental steps.  
In sum, as a practical application of the general 
concept of advertising as currency and an improvement 
to prior art technology, the claimed invention is not “so 
manifestly abstract as to override the statutory 
language of section 101.”  Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 
869.  Accordingly, this court reverses the district 
court’s dismissal of Ultramercial’s patent claims for 
lack of subject matter eligibility and remands for 
further proceedings.  This decision does not opine at all 
on the patentability of the claimed invention under the 
substantive criteria set forth in § 102, § 103, and § 112. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED 
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CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL 
Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) Order re: 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (DE 26 and 29) 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This is a patent infringement suit brought by 
Plaintiff Ultramercial, LLC (“Plaintiff”) against 
Defendants Hulu, LLC and Wildtangent, Inc. 
(collectively, “Defendants”) for alleged infringement of 
U.S. Patent No. 7,346,545 (the ’545 patent).1  Because 
the Court finds that the ’545 patent does not cover 
patentable subject matter, it GRANTS Wildtangent, 
Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (DE 29).  Hulu, LLC’s Motion 
to Dismiss (DE 26) is DENIED as moot. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The ’545 patent claims an invention for distributing 
copyrighted products over the Internet (or other 
                                                 
1 The Complaint originally named Youtube, LLC, as the third 
defendant. The parties, however, have already stipulated to 
Youtube, LLC’s dismissal. 
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networks).  In particular, the ’545 patent discloses a 
method for allowing Internet users to view copyrighted 
material free of charge in exchange for watching 
certain advertisements.  A computer or a server acts as 
a gateway between the Internet user and the 
copyrighted material.  An advertisement sponsor may 
purchase advertising space for a particular copyrighted 
material (a television show episode for example).  Upon 
attempting to stream a “free” television show episode, 
for example, the Internet user will be presented with 
advertisement.  The user cannot view the copyrighted 
material until the ad is fully displayed.  The result is 
that the viewer gets to watch what he wants for free, 
and the sponsor gets to deliver its advertisement to the 
intended audience. 
The two independent claims of the ’545 patent are 
claims 1 and 8. Claim 1, in its entirety, discloses a 
number of steps that comprise the process of 
displaying advertisement in exchange for access to 
copyrighted media.  The steps are 1) receiving media 
from content provider, 2) selecting an ad after 
consulting an activity log to determine how many times 
the ad has been played and how many more times it 
need be played, 3) offering media products on the 
Internet, 4) restricting general public access to the 
media, 5) offering various media to customers for free 
in exchange for their watching the selected ad, 6) 
receiving a request to view the media from the 
Internet user, 7) facilitating the display of the ad, 8) 
allowing the Internet user access to the media, 9) same 
as 8 but for interactive media, 10) recording the 
transaction in the activity log, and 11) receiving 
payment from sponsor for the ad. 
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The second independent claim (claim 8) is almost 
identical to claim 1.  The differences between the two 
independent claims are not material for the purpose of 
this Order.  The remaining (dependent) claims add 
more “steps” to those in the independent claims.  For 
example, claim 2 discloses “the step of paying royalties 
to the content provider.”  Claim 3 discloses “the step of 
entering into a licensing agreement with the owner of 
the intellectual property.”  Claim 4 discloses “the step 
of barring the content provider from pretending to be a 
customer” [to make sure the content provider cannot 
artificially inflate the view count].  Claim 5 discloses 
“the step of tendering payment to the content 
provider.”  Claim 6 discloses “the step of issuing [] a 
password” to the Internet user.”  Claim 7 discloses “the 
step of verifying a submitted password.”  And so on. 
III.  JUDICIAL STANDARD 
A party may move to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6).  In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court 
must assume that the plaintiff’s allegations are true 
and construe the complaint in the light most favorable 
to the non-moving party.  Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996).  Dismissal is 
appropriate only where the complaint lacks a 
cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a 
cognizable legal theory.  Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. 
Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008).  “While a 
complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 
does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s 
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to 
relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 
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will not do.”  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) 
(quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. 
Ct. 2832, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986)).  The court need not 
accept as true unreasonable inferences, unwarranted 
deductions of fact, or conclusory legal allegations cast 
in the form of factual allegations.  W. Mining Council v. 
Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
Under the Patent Act of 1952, subject matter 
patentability is a threshold requirement.  35 U.S.C 
§ 101. “Whoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions 
and requirements of this title.”  Id.  Recently in Bilski 
v. Kappos, __ U.S. __, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3225, 177 L. Ed. 
2d 792 (2010), the Supreme Court emphasized again 
that excluded from the patentable subject matter are 
“laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
ideas.”   
Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s ’545 patent 
does not disclose patentable subject matter.  Originally, 
this Motion was filed before the Supreme Court handed 
down the decision in Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3218.  In order 
to benefit from the Supreme Court’s guidance on the 
law regarding patentable subject matter and because 
of similarities between the case at hand and Bilski, this 
Court stayed the case until the Supreme Court issued 
its opinion.  Thereafter the parties filed supplemental 
briefings, in which they each provide their account of 
how the Supreme Court’s decision helps their case. 
After having reviewed the filings and the relevant case 
law in full, this Court finds that the ’545 patent does 
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not disclose patentable subject matter.  Not only does 
the patent fail the machine or transformation test, it 
claims an abstract idea.  Therefore, Plaintiff’s 
Complaint should be dismissed. 
A.  The ’545 Patent Does Not Satisfy the 
Machine or Transformation Test 
In In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the 
Federal Circuit held that a process is not patentable 
unless it is “tied to a particular machine,” or 
“transforms an article.”  The en banc decision produced 
various concurring and dissenting opinions, all of which 
need not be discussed here.  It suffices to mention that 
the so called “machine or transformation test,” 
according to the majority, was the sole test for 
patentability of processes, including business method 
and software patents.  Id.  And since the invention at 
issue in Bilski—a method for hedging investments—
did not meet the test, it was held to be invalid.  Id. 
On Supreme Court review, all Justice agreed that 
the Bilski patent was not covered by patentable 
subject matter. 130 S.Ct at 3218.  How one gets to that 
conclusion, however, the Justices did not agree.  The 
majority opinion thought it too broad to categorically 
invalidate all patents that do not meet the machine or 
transformation test.  Id. at 3226.  The machine or 
transformation test, according to the Supreme Court, 
provided a “useful and important clue,” but it was not 
determinative in all situations.  Id. at 3227.  Instead, 
the inquiry should be whether the claimed invention is 
a “law of nature, physical phenomena,” or an “abstract 
idea[].”  Id. at 3226.  Yet the Supreme Court did not 
offer an example of an invention that would not be tied 
to a machine or transform an article and still pass the 
subject matter test.  The Court stopped at holding that 
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the Bilski patent disclosed an abstract idea—the idea 
of hedging investments—and therefore, regardless of 
the machine or transformation test, it was invalid.  Id. 
at 3230-31. 
It is important to note, however, that even after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski, the machine or 
transformation test appears to have a major screening 
function—albeit not perfect—that separates 
unpatentable ideas from patentable ones.  Indeed, four 
of the Justices, listed on Justice Stevens’s concurring 
opinion, would have taken the machine or 
transformation test to its logical limit to hold that 
business methods are categorically unpatentable.  Id. 
at 3257 (Stevens, J., concurring).  Joining a concurring 
opinion, Justice Scalia, who signed on to parts of the 
plurality opinion as well, would not hold all business 
methods unpatentable, but would agree with Justice 
Breyer that “not [] many patentable processes lie 
beyond [the] reach [of the machine or transformation 
test].”  Id. at 3258 (Breyer, J., concurring).  In sum, at 
least five (and maybe all) Justices seem to agree that 
the machine or transformation test should retain much 
of its utility after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Bilski.  Therefore, even though the machine or 
transformation is no longer the litmus test for 
patentability, the Court will use it here as a key 
indicator of patentability. 
Turning to the mechanics of the test itself, the 
Court notes that not every patent that recites a 
machine or transformation of an article passes the 
machine or transformation test.  Bilski, 545 F.3d at 
961.  A mere recitation of a machine or transformation 
in the claim will not suffice because “[i]nsignificant 
postsolution activity will not transform an 
unpatentable principle into a patentable process.”  Id.  
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The machine or transformation “must impose 
meaningful limits on the claim’s scope to impart patent-
eligibility.”  Id. (citation omitted).  Below, the Court 
finds that the ’545 patent does not satisfy the machine 
or transformation test. 
1.  The ’545 Patent Is Not Tied to a Machine 
A machine is a “concrete thing, consisting of parts 
or of certain devices and combination of devices.”  In re 
Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009).2  Yet, 
physical steps are not needed to allow a process claim 
to be patentable.  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961.  As long 
as the invention is tied to a machine or transforms an 
article, it may be patentable notwithstanding its lack of 
physical steps.  Id. 
The two independent claims of the ’545 patent 
recite the steps of exchanging media for advertisement 
viewing.  There are only three points in the ’545 patent 
that the parties have identified as a possible reference 
to a machine.  The first two (“facilitator” and 
“Internet”) appear in the independent claims (1 and 8): 
“A method for distribution of products over the 
Internet via a facilitator.”  The third appears in 
dependent claim 16: “The method . . . wherein media 
product accessed by the consumer is downloaded to a 
memory of a personal computer of the consumer.”  The 
Court finds that none of the three satisfy the machine 
prong of the test. 
                                                 
2 It was undisputed in Bilski that the machine part of the 
machine or transformation test was not satisfied.  545 F.3d at 962.  
Therefore, Bilski does not provide much guidance on how to apply 
the machine prong of the test. 
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Despite Plaintiff’s argument, the “facilitator” 
recitation does not meet the machine requirement.  
First, there is no reason to read “facilitator” as a 
machine such as a computer.  Indeed, the patent 
specification suggests the contrary: the schematics in 
the patent specification depict the facilitator as a 
person.  Moreover, the ’545 patent explains that the 
facilitator may “communicate through . . . telephony, 
facsimile, courier, mail or even person-to-person 
meeting.”  The specification makes it clear, therefore, 
that the ’545 patent is not aimed at a computer-specific 
application; it is a broad claim to the concept of 
exchanging media for advertisement viewing. 
Neither does the “Internet” recitation save the 
patent.  First, this Court agrees with the District 
Court in the Northern District of California that held 
the Internet is not a machine.  CyberSource Corp. v. 
Retail Decisions, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 
2009) (“[T]he Internet is an abstraction.”  “One can 
touch a computer or a network cable, but one cannot 
touch ‘the internet.’”).  In CyberSource, the court held 
that methods for “detecting fraud in credit card 
transaction between consumer and merchant over the 
Internet were not tied to a specific machine.”  Id. at 
1077-78 (emphasis added).  This Court agrees in full 
with the court’s reasoning in CyberSource to the effect 
that the “over the Internet” recitation does not make 
an otherwise unpatentable idea patentable.  Id. 
Finally, the mere act of storing media on computer 
memory does not tie the ’545 invention to a machine in 
any meaningful way.  Since Plaintiff does not argue this 
point, the Court will not address it in detail.  It suffices 
to say, however, that the argument would have been 
too farfetched and hence futile. 
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Plaintiff makes two counter arguments that need be 
addressed.  First, Plaintiff points to many steps in the 
’545 patent that, according to Plaintiff, address 
computer-specific functions (such as issuing and 
verifying passwords, transmitting an ad until it is 
timed out, making content physically available to the 
consumer, etc.).  (Pl. Opp., at 16.)  Second, Plaintiff 
argues that the segments of the patent specification 
quoted here only says that “some communication [may] 
take place without a programmed machine (e.g., 
communication between a IP rights holder and 
interposed sponsor),” but “all communication between 
the consumer and facilitator take place utilizing a 
specifically-programmed computer.”3  (Pl. Opp., at 
17:25-18:15.)  In sum, Plaintiff argues that the ’545 
patent is computer-specific and not a broad invention 
that may be performed by a person.  As a result, 
Plaintiff suggests that the ’545 patent meets the 
machine prong of the test. 
                                                 
3 The preferred embodiment specification states in pertinent 
part, 
In accordance with the preferred embodiment, four principals 
are preferably present: a facilitator, a consumer, an 
intellectual property (IP) rights holder, and an interposed 
sponsor.  All of the principals preferably communicate over a 
telecommunications network such as the Internet, using their 
respective computers: facilitator’s computer, consumer’s 
computer, IP rights holder’s computer 30A and interposed 
sponsor’s computer.  Three of the principals (facilitator, IP 
rights holder and interposed sponsor) may also communicate 
through a twoway communications path, which may include 
telephony, facsimile, courier, mail or even person-to-person 
meetings. 
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Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing.  There is nothing 
inherently computer-specific about receiving media 
from a content provider, choosing a sponsor for the 
media, selecting an ad for the sponsor, verifying the 
viewer’s activity, assigning passwords, charging the 
sponsor for the advertisement, or any of the remaining 
steps. 
Yet Plaintiff is perhaps still correct to point out that 
the only useful application of Plaintiff’s invention is 
with relation to the Internet, where the facilitator is a 
specifically “programmed computer.”4  That does not 
mean, however, that the patent claims are limited to 
use on a computer, or, more importantly, that they are 
tied to one.  That the disclosed invention is only used on 
computers or computer networks cannot alone satisfy 
the machine test without rendering the test completely 
toothless.5  As already stated above, the machine must 
limit the invention in a meaningful way.  One cannot 
circumvent the patentability test by merely limiting 
the use of the invention to a computer.  The binary 
representation, one of the most fundamental concepts 
that has enabled digital computation as we know it 
today was not patentable, even though its utility was 
                                                 
4 The “programmed computer” argument has its origin in In 
re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  That decision 
articulated the “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test for 
patentable subject matter, which was subsequently abrogated by 
the Federal Circuit in Bilski 545 F.3d at 959-60. 
5 The Court is aware that software patents or other method 
patents that involve programmed computers have never been 
categorically rejected under the patentable subject matter test.  
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972) (declining to hold that 
all patents for any “program servicing a computer” are invalid 
under § 101). 
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linked to “general-purpose digital computers.” 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972).  Similarly 
in the case of the ’545 patent, the concept of 
advertisement-media-exchange does not become 
patentable simply because the patentee claims to have 
limited its application to the Internet or computers. 
Therefore, the ’545 patent fails the machine test. 
2. The ’545 Patent Does Not Transform an 
Article 
There can be little dispute that the ’545 patent does 
not transform an article.  “Transformation and 
reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is 
the clue to the patentability of a process claim that 
does not include particular machines.”  Id. at 70.  None 
of the patent claims disclose a transformation.  Plaintiff 
points to claim 16, which recites, “The method . . . 
wherein media product accessed by the consumer is 
downloaded to a memory of a personal computer of the 
consumer.”  Yet the mere transfer of data from one 
memory disk on one computer to another memory 
space in a second computer is not “transformation of 
article” under § 101.  And the parties have not pointed 
out a case that held otherwise.  That is not surprising: 
the nature of the computer memory does not vary 
based on what is stored in it.  And even if storing 
content on a computer memory constituted 
transforming an article, Plaintiff’s argument would still 
fail because such “transformation” is merely incidental 
to the ’545 patent claims.  What Plaintiff claims is the 
process of trading viewing of the advertisements for 
free access to media.  That the media may be 
transferred from one computer (or server) to another is 
merely incidental.  Cf. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 
(1981) (holding that the method of using temperature 
65a 
readings from a rubber press and inputting the reading 
in a well-known mathematical formula to determine 
accurately the cure-time was patentable because the 
process was meaningfully limited to transformation of 
an article).  Unlike in Diehr, the ’545 patent does not 
disclose a method for transforming an article, or the 
transformation disclosed is not a meaningful limitation 
to the claimed invention.  Therefore, the 
transformation prong of the test is also not satisfied. 
B.  The ’545 Patent Discloses an Abstract Idea 
In Bilski, the Supreme Court held that a method 
for hedging investments was an abstract idea and 
hence unpatentable.  130 S.Ct. at 3218.  Claim 1 of the 
Bilski patent simply disclosed a number of steps in a 
particular hedging method: 1) trading commodity with 
a buyer at a price based on historical averages and the 
buyer’s risk position, 2) finding buyers that have 
another type of risk position that counters the first 
buyer in step one, and 3) transacting with the second 
consumer in a way to balance (hedge) the risk of the 
transaction.  Id. at 3223-24.  The patent then went on to 
disclose the application of this method in trading 
energy commodities.  Id. at 3224. 
In rejecting the patent, the Supreme Court first 
noted that “hedging is a fundamental economic 
practice.”  Id. at 3231.  Therefore, the core of the patent 
was not patentable because “allowing petitioners to 
patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of this 
approach in all fields.”  Id.  Moreover, the remaining 
recitations did not rescue the patent because they were 
only “broad examples of how hedging can be used in 
commodities and energy markets.”  Id.  Since the core 
of the patent was an abstract idea, and the additional 
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limitations did not meaningfully contain the claimed 
invention, the Bilski invention was not patentable. 
The case at hand is very similar.  At the core of the 
’545 patent is the basic idea that one can use 
advertisement as an exchange or currency.  An 
Internet user can pay for copyrighted media by sitting 
through a sponsored message instead of paying money 
to download the media.  This core principle, similar to 
the core of the Bilski patent, is an abstract idea. 
Indeed, public television channels have used the same 
basic idea for years to provide free (or offset the cost 
of) media to their viewers.6  At its heart, therefore, the 
patent does no more than disclose an abstract idea. 
Also similar to the patent in Bilski, the added 
features, examples, or limitations of the ’545 patent do 
not make it patentable.  That the exchange 
(advertisement for media) is carried over the Internet, 
through a facilitator, using passwords and activity logs, 
does not limit the patent in a meaningful way.  The 
patent still discloses an abstract idea garnished with 
accessories.  If the claimed invention here were 
patentable, it would “preempt use of this [method] in 
all fields.”  Id. 
Two points need be made clear at the end.  One is 
that the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that this 
Motion should not be decided before claim construction. 
While the Court (and the parties) consulted the claims 
                                                 
6 The Court is cognizant of the difference between patentable 
subject matter and obviousness requirements.  The point made 
here is that the core of the disclosed invention is an abstract 
principle similar to the hedging principle in Bilski; lack of novelty 
is not the (intended) message.  Although the invention here may 
obvious, that determination is not before the Court. 
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and the specification, there is no need to formally 
construe any of the claims.  The patent terms are clear, 
and Plaintiff has not brought to the Court’s attention 
any reasonable construction that would bring the 
patent within patentable subject matter.  Moreover, 
given the lack of clarity in this area of patent law, it is 
perhaps even more appropriate for this Court to 
render its decision at the earliest stage so that the 
parties may benefit from the Federal Circuit’s 
guidance on the issue sooner rather than later, if they 
so desire. 
Second, the Court acknowledges that this case calls 
for the difficult task of deciphering whether the ’545 
invention falls under the Bilski or Diehr categories.  In 
both, the claimed invention discloses a real-world 
application of a mathematical formula.  In both, a well-
known or basic principle is linked to its practical use. 
Yet in one (Diehr), the invention is patentable; in the 
other (Bilski), not.  In deciding which one of the two 
categories the ’545 patent fits, the Court consulted the 
machine or transformation test.  The Court also noted 
that the similarities between the ’545 patent and the 
Bilski patent point toward invalidity.  Finally, the 
Court noted that the additional limitations beyond the 
abstract idea at the core of the ’545 patent do not limit 
the claimed invention in a meaningful way.  Therefore, 
the Court holds that the ’545 patent does not cover 
patentable subject matter. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Court GRANTS Wildtangent, Inc.’s Motion to 
Dismiss (DE 29).  Hulu, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss (DE 
26) is DENIED as moot. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for further 
consideration in light of Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. 
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S.      , 132 S. Ct. 1289, 
182 L. Ed. 2d 321 (2012). 
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
 
2010-1544 
 
ULTRAMERCIAL, LLC and ULTRAMERCIAL, 
INC., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
HULU, LLC, 
Defendant, 
and 
WILDTANGENT, INC., 
Defendant-Appellee. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California in case no. 09-CV-6918, 
Judge R. Gary Klausner. 
ORDER 
A petition for rehearing en banc having been filed 
by the Appellee,* and the matter having first been 
referred as a petition for rehearing to the panel that 
heard the appeal, and thereafter the petition for 
rehearing en banc having been referred to the circuit 
judges who are in regular active service, 
UPON CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is 
ORDERED that the petition for rehearing be, and 
the same hereby is, DENIED and it is further 
                                                 
* The court granted Electronic Frontier Foundation, et al. 
leave to file a brief amici curiae in support of Appellee’s petition 
for rehearing en banc. 
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ORDERED that the petition for rehearing en banc 
be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 
The mandate of the court will issue on November 
28, 2011. 
Circuit Judge Moore did not participate in the vote. 
 
FOR THE COURT, 
s/Jan Horbaly /LB 
Jan Horbaly 
Clerk 
 
Dated:  11/18/2011 
 
cc: Lawrence M. Hadley 
 Darin W. Snyder, Gregory G. Garre 
 Julie Samuels 
[File stamp omitted] 
 
ULTRAMERCIAL V HULU, 2010-1544 
(DCT - 09-CV-6918) 
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
 
2010-1544 
 
ULTRAMERCIAL, LLC and ULTRAMERCIAL, 
INC., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
HULU, LLC, 
Defendant, 
and 
WILDTANGENT, INC., 
Defendant-Appellee. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California in case no. 09-CV-6918, 
Judge R. Gary Klausner. 
ORDER 
A petition for hearing en banc having been filed by 
the Appellee, 
UPON CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is 
ORDERED that the petition for rehearing be, and 
the same hereby is, DENIED. 
Circuit Judge Moore did not participate in the vote. 
 
FOR THE COURT, 
s/Jan Horbaly 
Jan Horbaly 
Clerk 
 
Dated:  09/24/2012 
cc: Lawrence M. Hadley 
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 Darin W. Snyder 
Gregory G. Garre 
 Julie P. Samuels 
 Peter J. Brann 
 Daryl Joseffer 
[File stamp omitted] 
 
ULTRAMERCIAL V HULU, 2010-1544 
(DCT - 09-CV-6918) 
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U.S. CONSTITUTION 
ARTICLE I 
 
Section 8. 
The Congress shall have power . . . 
 
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries; 
* * * 
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35 U.S.C. § 100 
 
§ 100.  Definitions 
When used in this title unless the context otherwise 
indicates— 
* * * 
(b)  The term “process” means process, art or 
method, and includes a new use of a known process, 
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or 
material. 
* * * 
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35 U.S.C. § 101 
 
§ 101.  Inventions patentable 
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions 
and requirements of this title. 
 
